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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3)(i) and (4)(a) (1953 as amended) whereby a defendant in a
criminal case may take an appeal to the Supreme Court from a final
judgment of conviction of a first degree felony which may
subsequently be transferred to this Court.

Mr. Carlos R. Sampson was

convicted of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, a first
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1953 as
amended) in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.

v m

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1.

Did Mr. Sampson invoke his right to counsel; and, if

so, did police officers fail to clarify his equivocal request for
counsel; and, if so, did Mr. Sampson later waive that right?
2.

Did the trial court err when it failed to either

rehabilitate two jurors who expressed bias or remove them for cause?
3.

Were photographs and slides that reached the jury over

objections so prejudicial to warrant reversal of Mr. Sampson's
conviction?
4.

Did the trial court erroneously apply Utah Code Ann.

§ 77-14-3 to the facts of this case thereby necessitating a new
trial; and, if not, is that statute unconstitutional?
5.

Was there insufficient evidence to sustain the

conviction of Mr. Sampson?
6.

Did the trial court improperly instruct the jury on

depraved indifference such that reversal is warranted?
7.

Did the prosecutors misbehave in a manner which placed

evidence before the jurors they were not entitled to hear and which
probably affected their verdict?
8.

Were the cumulative errors and irregularities of this

trial enough to require reversal of Mr. Sampson's conviction?

ix

TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Amendment V of the Constitution of the United States provides;
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous c rime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a G rand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
in the Militia, when in actual s ervice in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor sh all be compelled
in any criminal case to be a wit ness against
himself, nor be deprived of life , liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for pu blic use, without
just compensation.
Amendment VI of the Constitution of the United States provides:
In all criminal p rosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the c rime shall have been
committed, which distr ict shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed
of the nature and caus e of the accusation; to be
confronted with the wi tnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for
his defence.
Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the United States provides in
pertinent part:
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject t o the jurisdiction thereof,
are citi zens of the U nited States and of the State
wherein they reside, No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immun ities of citi zens of the United States;
nor shal 1 any State d eprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any perso n within its jurisdiction the
equal pr otection of t he laws.

x

Art. I, § 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.
Art. I, § 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 12 [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person and
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance
shall any accused person, before final judgment,
be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself;
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against
her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 provides in pertinent part:
76-5-203. Murder in the second degree.
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the
second degree if the actor:
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the
death of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury
to another, he commits an act clearly
dangerous to human life that causes the death
of another;
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a
depraved indifference to human life, he
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk
of death to another and thereby causes the
death of another; or
(2) Murder in the second degree is a felony of
the first degree.

xi

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 provides:
76-5-205. Manslaughter.
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if
the actor:
(a) recklessly causes the death of another;
or
(b) causes the death of another under the
influence of extreme emotional disturbance
for which there is a reasonable explanation
or excuse; or
(c) causes the death of another under
circumstances where the actor reasonably
believes the circumstances provide a legal
justification or excuse for his conduct
although the conduct is not legally
justifiable or excusable under the existing
circumstances.
(2) Under Subsection (l)(b), emotional
disturbance does not include a condition resulting
from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2-305,
(3) The reasonableness of an explanation or
excuse under Subsection (l)(b), or the reasonable
belief of the actor under Subsection (l)(c), shall
be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable
person under the then existing circumstances.
(4) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree,
Utah Code Ann. §77-14-3 provides:
77-14-3. Insanity or diminished mental
capacity—Notice requirement—Expert testimony.
(1) When a defendant proposes to offer
evidence that he is not guilty as a result of
insanity or that he had diminished mental capacity
or any other testimony of a mental health expert
to establish mental state, he shall, at the time
of arraignment or as soon afterward as
practicable, but not fewer than 30 days before the
trial, file and serve the prosecuting attorney
with written notice of his intention to claim the
defense.
(2) When either the prosecution or the
defense intends to call any mental health expert
to testify at trial regarding a defendant's mental
state, excluding rebuttal testimony, the expert
shall be required to prepare a written report of

xii

findings, and counsel intending to call the expert
shall provide a copy of any report to opposing
counsel as soon as practicable, but not less than
ten days before trial.
(3) If the defendant fails to meet the
requirements of Subsection (1), he may not
introduce evidence tending to establish the
defense unless the court for good cause shown
otherwise orders.
(4) Nothing in this section is intended to
require the admission of evidence not otherwise
admissible.
Rule 18 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in
pertinent part:
Rule 18.

Selection of jury.
. . . . .

(e) The challenge for cause is an objection
to a particular juror and may be taken on one or
more of the following grounds:
(13) having formed or expressed an
unqualified opinion or belief as to whether
the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the
offense charged; or
(14) that a state of mind exists on the
part of the juror with reference to the
cause, or to either party, which will prevent
him from acting impartially and without
prejudice to the substantial rights of the
party challenging; but no person shall be
disqualified as a juror by reason of having
formed or expressed an opinion upon the
matter or cause to be submitted to such jury,
founded upon public rumor, statements in
public journals or common notoriety, if it
satisfactorily appears to the court that the
juror can and will, notwithstanding such
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the
matter to be submitted to him.

xiii

Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

xiv

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
CARLOS REINALDO SAMPSON,

Case No. 890327-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1953 as amended),
following a jury trial held September 22-30, 1987, in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the Honorable David S. Young, Judge, presiding.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Carlos Reinaldo Sampson was born September 3, 1960.

At

the age of seven months, he contracted Spinal Meningitis (T. 75),1
described as "a serious infection of the brain that can cause brain
damage11 (S2. 8 ) . Carlos is borderline mentally retarded (S2. 8-9).
He spent his school years in special education classes (T. 691) and

1 Citations to the record throughout this brief will be
as follows: "T" will mean trial transcripts Volumes I-VI, inasmuch
as their pagination is sequential; "PHT" will refer to the
preliminary hearing transcript; "JS" will reference the jury
selection transcript; "SI" and S2" will indicate the sentencing
hearings; and "MS" will signify the motion to suppress hearing.

has demonstrated a difficulty with reasoning and common sense from
Kindergarten throughout his years (T. 691, 725-26).

Although Carlos

ultimately graduated from high school, it was a struggle and not
without great family sacrifice (T. 701). He continued to have
trouble with responsibility throughout his adult life (T. 698, 700,
732, 737-38).
Carlos Sampson and Antoinette Matthews met on July 14,
1984 as she was walking with her luggage near the bus stop in
San Bernardino, California (T. 751). A relationship began between
them which included sexual relations.

Within days or weeks,

Antoinette Matthews became pregnant with Carlos1 child (T. 32). At
the the time, both Antoinette and Carlos were living at home with
their respective mothers.

On April 25, 1985, a baby girl was born

to Carlos and Antoinette and she was named Miyako Rayiesh Sampson
(T. 33).
After the birth of Miyako, Antoinette and her daughter
lived with Antoinette's mother for approximately six weeks and then
moved in with Carlos (T. 35). The three of them moved into a studio
apartment in San Bernardino, California in July of 1985 (T. 35).
At a birthday party in Carlos1 honor in September of
1985, Carlos was introduced to cocaine (T. 39-40, 763). Carlos1 use
of cocaine ultimately encouraged Antoinette to move back to her
mother's house in October of 1985 taking Miyako with her.

Carlos'

father, Don Re Sampson, living in Salt Lake City, Utah, heard of the
drug use.

In November 1985, he brought Carlos to Utah, where he and

Carlos' twin brothers, Adrian and Aaron, also lived and could watch
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-

out for and monitor Carlos1 life style.

As intended, the drug usage

stopped (T. 763).
While in Utah, Carlos lived with his brother Aaron at his
apartment (T. 764). Carlos would telephone Antoinette nearly every
day to talk with her and to see how she and Miyako were doing
(T. 764). Monthly telephone bills reached nearly $300 (T. 658).
Plans were often discussed that Antoinette and Miyako would come to
Utah to live with Carlos; marriage was also contemplated (T. 767).
Ultimately, Antoinette and Miyako moved to Utah in April
of 1986.

They moved in with Carlos, who was still staying at his

brother's apartment (T. 768). Carlos and Antoinette often argued,
and, at times, the arguments would become physical exchanges.

One

incident discussed often at trial was an exchange where Antoinette
attempted to choke Carlos, who then slapped her (T. 770). That
incident precipitated Antoinette's moving from Aaron's apartment to
the YWCA in July of 1986.
three weeks.

Antoinette and Miyako lived at the Y for

During that time, Carlos would walk thirty blocks to

visit Miyako and Antoinette (T. 772). Antoinette and Miyako then
moved to an apartment located at Third South and Third East in Salt
Lake City (T. 773).
Carlos was seeing a lot of Miyako, keeping her nights
while Antoinette worked.
and became "saved."

Antoinette then became involved in church

After that, she told Carlos she didn't want him

around any longer because he was a sinner and wasn't keeping up his
responsibilities (T. 774). Nonetheless, Carlos continued to have
contact with Antoinette and Miyako.

- 3

At times, he would come to her

-

house and "hang around" until Antoinette returned so that he could
see his daughter Miyako (T. 774-75).
On one occasion, Carlos was invited to Antoinette's house
for dinner.
home.

Upon arriving at the appropriate hour, no one was

He left the apartment and walked to the corner grocery store

to see if perhaps Antoinette and Miyako were there buying some
last-minute purchases for dinner.

Upon returning to the apartment,

he noticed a male crawling out the bedroom window of Antoinette's
apartment (T. 777). Carlos became more and more frustrated with how
Antoinette treated him and with his inability to maintain what he
considered his family unit (T. 774). At that point, Carlos began
asking Antoinette for a visiting schedule or list to be made of when
he could see his daughter Miyako (T. 774-75).

Such a list was never

prepared and became a critical and volatile issue between Carlos and
Antoinette.
In early October 1986, Antoinette and Miyako moved to an
apartment on Atherton Drive in Salt Lake City.

Soon thereafter,

they took a train trip back to California to visit family.

Carlos

did not want them to go and tried to physically restrain Antoinette
from leaving.

She spit in his face and he relented and took them to

the train station (T. 775-76).

At the station, Carlos again

insisted she not go and even boarded the train to try to convince
her.

Antoinette and Miyako left anyway; they returned a week later

(T. 776).
Around 7:00 a.m. on November 24, 1986, Carlos awakened
Antoinette by knocking on the door to her apartment (T. 48). Carlos

- 4

desired to take Miyako to work with him.

Antoinette resisted

because she and Miyako had been with Carlos before on his job and
Carlos would have to leave the truck on occasions, which, without
Antoinette's presence, would leave Miyako alone in the pickup truck
(T. 779-80).

Carlos persisted, and Antoinette eventually relented

and told Carlos he could take Miyako with him later that day
(T. 781).
Antoinette then informed Carlos of her intentions to take
Miyako to California for Thanksgiving two days later.

Carlos

disapproved because his family—father and wife, brothers Aaron and
Adrian and their girlfriends and children—were planning to spend
the holiday together.

Carlos felt bad because he wanted his

family—Antoinette and Miyako—to go with him to the Thanksgiving
dinner and, if they didn't, he would be alone (T. 51). Carlos and
Antoinette then compromised that Carlos could take Miyako later that
day and spend the rest of the day and night with her and bring her
back in time for Miyako and Antoinette to go to church prior to
catching the train for California (T. 51-52).
Carlos left for work and Antoinette returned to bed.
Moments later, Carlos again knocked on the door.

Antoinette

answered and Carlos explained that his truck battery was dead and
that "it needed a jump" (T. 52). Antoinette assisted him to get the
truck started.

She then again returned to bed.

Approximately

fifteen minutes later, Carlos telephoned and asked whether Miyako
was ready yet for him to pick her up (T. 53). Carlos said he was on
his way from Adrian's house and would be there momentarily.
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Antoinette took Miyako, got in the car, drove around the block, and
then parked where she could watch the apartment (T. 53-54).

She

watched Carlos arrive and leave, and then she returned to the house
and went back to bed.

Antoinette admitted having done the same

things on other occasions—arrange for Carlos to pick up Miyako and
then leave with Miyako until Carlos had come and gone (T. 54).
Approximately 3:00 p.m. that same day, Carlos called
again to see if he could come and get Miyako.
Carlos arrived ten minutes later.

Antoinette agreed.

Miyako was in the bathtub.

Carlos washed her hair and got her out of the tub (T. 55-56).
Antoinette then dressed her and prepared a diaper bag.

Miyako left

with Carlos between 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. (T. 60).
Shortly after Carlos and Miyako left, Antoinette received
another telephone call, again from Carlos, who again wanted to talk
about visitation rights (T. 62). He indicated that he wanted
Antoinette to draw up a schedule for when he could have Miyako
(T. 63). Antoinette responded that Carlos had been keeping her a
lot lately without any troubles and questioned the necessity of a
schedule.

Carlos insisted she draw up a paper before she leave for

California and that, if not, Miyako would not be going with her
(T. 63). Carlos hung up the telephone.
Antoinette then went to the apartment where Carlos was
staying with his brother Aaron and Aaron's roommate, Curtis Owens.
Antoinette arrived there around 4:30 p.m.

She informed Carlos that

she did not have to draw up the paper before leaving and that she
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would wait to do it after she returned from California (T. 783-84).
Antoinette further threatened that, if he did not return Miyako the
next day so that she could go to church and then to the train
station, Antoinette would take Carlos1 name off the birth
certificate, terminating all his legal rights to Miyako (T. 69,
784-85).
Antoinette and Carlos further discussed the trip to
California.

Carlos asked whether Antoinette would take Miyako to

see his mother while there.
(T. 70-71).

Antoinette said that she would

Carlos then indicated that he would bring back Miyako

as originally planned because he wanted his mother to see Miyako
(T. 70-71, 121).
After Antoinette left Aaronfs apartment, Miyako cried
because her mother had left (T. 71). Carlos went to the couch with
Miyako; he felt terrible (T. 786). Carlos went to the kitchen and,
when he turned around, Miyako was off the couch and playing with his
drink.

He hit Miyako, demanding she leave the drink alone

(T. 786). She cried.

Moments later, Carlos again noticed that

Miyako was playing with his drink.

He grabbed her and hit her again

(T. 786-88).
Sometime later, Carlos walked Miyako down the hall to
Aaron's bedroom (T. 185). They passed by Curtis Owens, who was in
his bedroom; Carlos had Miyako wave to Curtis (T. 185). Curtis
testified that he then heard Carlos chastising Miyako, followed by
muffled sounds which Curtis demonstrated by striking his fist on his
leg (T. 186-87).

Later, when Curtis left his bedroom to go to the
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refrigerator, he returned and stepped into Aaron's room telling
Carlos to change the child's diaper (T. 189-90).

He at that point

noticed the child was motionless on the bed as if sleeping (T. 189).
Within a short period of time, family members began
arriving for the Monday night football game.
Aaron's room, ostensibly taking a nap.

Miyako was left in

Throughout the next couple

of hours, Miyako was on the couch, apparently sleeping, or on
Carlos' shoulder sleeping or returned to the bedroom where she
slept.

Other children were present in the apartment playing during

the football game.

Yet, Miyako did not stir.

Several of the attendees at the football game that
evening commented that, in retrospect, perhaps it was odd that
Miyako had slept so intensely during the football game.

However, no

one that evening was concerned with the behavior of Miyako nor did
they indicate anything was so far out of character to draw
particular attention (T. 154). Shortly after half-time, Carlos
placed Miyako on his shoulder and left the apartment.

He told the

individuals there he was going to return the baby to Antoinette
(T. 152). Carlos went to the telephone booth near his home,
telephoned Antoinette, and received no answer (T. 791).
Carlos then placed Miyako in the truck and drove to
American Fork (T. 825-26).

He unclothed the dead baby.

Upon

arriving in American Fork, Carlos decided to place Miyako's body in
a garbage bag and to put the garbage sack in a dumpster
(T. 827-28).
7-Eleven.

Carlos then returned to Salt Lake City and went to the

He walked into the 7-Eleven and told the two clerks there
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that his daughter had been kidnapped (T. 251, 829-30).

He asked

them to please call the police and then he left the premises
(T. 246), telling the clerks that he was looking for his baby.
Carlos returned momentarily and talked to the police on the
telephone, giving the description of the child and what she was
wearing.

The police responded in mass as twenty-six officers were

looking for the missing Miyako (T. 279). Police investigators
talked to the family and, for much of the evening, the search
continued.

Carlos was eventually asked to come down to police

headquarters the next morning so that they might question him and
submit him to a polygraph examination.
The following morning at 10:30, Carlos arrived at police
headquarters, where he was met by Sgt. Elliott, who explained the
workings of a polygraph machine, read him his Miranda rights, and
then proceeded with the polygraph interrogation.

(The method of

obtaining a waiver of his Miranda rights was challenged by defense
counsel at trial (MS. 1-38).)

After the polygraph examination,

Sgt. Elliott accompanied Mr. Sampson to a location where Sheriff
Hayward was speaking with other officers and informed both
Mr. Sampson and the Sheriff that he believed his answers to be
untruthful.

Sheriff Hayward then accompanied Mr. Sampson back to

the same interrogation room; he told Carlos he did not believe he
had been telling the truth.
whereabouts of his child.

He asked whether Carlos knew the

At that point, Carlos asked Sheriff

Hayward for a cigarette; the Sheriff stepped out and returned within
seconds with a cigarette (T. 428). Carlos stood up, placed his hand
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on Sheriff Hayward's shoulder, and told him, "my baby's dead"
(T. 428-29).
Sheriff Hayward and Detective Judd then placed Carlos in
the back of a police cruiser, and Carlos directed them to the
location in American Fork where he had placed Miyako's body in a
garbage bag and then, in turn, the dumpster (T. 429-33).

The body

was recovered (T. 433).
The medical examiner indicated that the cause of death
was a severe laceration of the liver with asphyxia as a possible
component of death, as well (T. 574, 621).
Prior to trial, the defense filed a motion to suppress
statements given by Mr. Sampson and any evidence derived from those
statements inasmuch as those statements and that evidence was
received in violation of the prophylactic protections to the fifth
amendment commonly referred to as the Miranda rights (MS. 5-6).
That motion was denied (MS. 37). However, defense counsel sought
and obtained a continuing objection to all such evidence (T. 371-72),
During voir dire, several jurors indicated their
inability to be impartial jurors regarding the subject matter of
this case.

Two jurors, in particular, were challenged for cause on

that basis (JS. 151-58).

The trial court, however, denied those

challenges for cause requiring the defense to use a peremptory
challenge (JS. 156).
During the course of the trial, a motion in limine was
argued before the court to exclude various photographs, slides and a
video tape depicting the body of Miyako Sampson from the dumpster
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scene or regarding the autopsy.

The trial court granted the motion

to exclude the video tape but admitted, over objection, the
photographs and slides (T. 450-51).
During the defense case, the defense indicated a desire
to call a psychologist to the stand to rebut testimony in the
State's case-in-chief.
testimony.

The State objected to that proffered

The trial court agreed with the State and precluded the

psychologist from testifying over the objection of the defense
(T. 722).
During the course of trial, the defense objected to the
behavior of the prosecutors and, specifically, at one point moved
for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct (T. 217). That
motion was denied (T. 219).
The defense took exception to the court's failure to give
several of the defense's requested instructions including two
distinct instructions on the law pertaining to depraved
indifference.

During deliberations, the jury sent out a question to

the judge asking for clarification regarding the depraved
indifference instruction; the court refused to clarify that
instruction (R. 322).
Ultimately, the jurors returned with a verdict of guilty
of Second Degree Homicide against Mr. Sampson.

He was subsequently

sentenced to five years to life at the Utah State Prison, where he
currently resides.

This appeal followed.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Police officers violated Mr. Sampson's fifth amendment
safeguards when they failed to clarify an equivocal request for
counsel and continued with interrogation warranting reversal of his
conviction.
The trial court prejudiced Mr. Sampson's right to a fair
trial by failing to excuse two jurors for cause who indicated their
inability to be impartial.
Slides and photographs were admitted over defense
objections which inflamed the jury and denied Mr. Sampson his
guaranteed fair trial by impartial jurors.
The trial court applied Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3 in a
manner which precluded Mr. Sampson from having a witness testify for
his defense and which violated his rights of fundamental fairness
and due process.
Insufficient evidence was adduced at trial to support
Mr. Sampson's conviction of Second Degree Homicide.
Mr. Sampson suffered prejudice when the trial court
improperly instructed jurors on the theory of depraved indifference.
Prosecutorial misconduct inflamed the jurors against
Mr. Sampson and likely impacted on their verdict thereby requiring
that Mr. Sampson's conviction be reversed.
The cumulative effect of the errors and irregularities in
this case demand that the conviction against Mr. Sampson be reversed.
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ARGUMENT

I. POLICE INTERROGATION OF MR, SAMPSON VIOLATED
HIS RIGHTS AS OUTLINED IN MIRANDA AS PROTECTING
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION.
Prior to trial, Mr. Sampson filed a motion to suppress
statements made by him in three different interrogation sessions as
well as the evidence adduced from those statements inasmuch as they
were the product of Miranda violations (R. 93-142).

That motion was

renewed at trial and incorporated into the record (T. 371-72).

The

trial court, nonetheless, denied the motion (R. 169). Mr. Sampson
asserts that the trial court committed reversible error when it
denied that motion.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United
States Supreme Court established the importance of protecting the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

The Court in

that opinion required that custodial interrogation be preceded by
advising the person being interrogated that, inter alia, he has the
right to the presence of an attorney during questioning.
384 U.S. at 471.

Miranda,

The Miranda Court then recognized that, under

certain circumstances, the person being interrogated may validly
waive the right to counsel.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.

However, the

Court noted that if the interrogation continues without the presence
of an attorney, the State has a heavy burden of establishing a valid
waiver of the accused's privilege against self-incrimination and his
right to counsel.

Id.; see also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,
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490 n. 14 (1964).

Moreover, courts adhere to the law outlined in

Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977), that they are to
"indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver."

Brewer,

430 U.S. at 404; see also United States v. Cherry, 733 F.2d 1124,
1131 (5th Cir. 1984); and United States v. Prestigiacomo, 504
F.Supp. 681, 684 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
Miranda v. Arizona further states that if the person
being interrogated "indicates in any manner and at any stage of the
process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking
there can be no [further] questioning."
(emphasis added).

384 U.S. at 444-45

In Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984), the

Supreme Court stated:
An accused in custody, "having expressed his
desire to deal with the police only through
counsel is not subject to further interrogation by
the authorities until counsel has been made
available to him," unless he validly waives his
earlier request for the assistance of counsel.
Id. at 94-95 (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85
(1981)).

The Smith Court, calling this a "rigid prophylactic rule,"

then maintained that the first inquiry was to determine whether the
accused actually invokes his right to counsel.

See, Edwards v.

Arizona, 451 U.S. at 484-85; and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at
444-45.
The Smith Court also recognized that a person being
interrogated may invoke the right to counsel either unequivocally or
equivocally.

If the person being interrogated expresses his desire

for counsel in an unequivocal manner, then the rule laid out in
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Edwards v. Arizona applies.

That "bright-line rule" requires that

"all questioning must cease after an accused requests counsel."
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. at 98 (citing Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S.
638, 646 (1984)).

Under Edwards, once counsel is requested "courts

may admit an accused's responses to further questioning only upon a
finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the police,
and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had
invoked."

Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. at 95 (citing Edwards v.

Arizona, 451 U.S. at 485, 486 n. 9 ) .
The Smith Court announced that an accused's request for
counsel also may be invoked in an ambiguous or equivocal manner.
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. at 95.

The Court acknowledged the

development among lower courts of conflicting standards as to the
consequences of equivocal invocations of the right to counsel.

The

Court stated, "We need not resolve this conflict in the instant
case, however, because the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court
must be reversed irrespective of which standard is implied."
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. at 96.

The Court outlined the three

conflicting standards in a footnote to the opinion.

It reads:

(1) Some courts have held that all questioning
must cease upon any request for or reference to
counsel, however equivocal or ambiguous. (2)
Others have attempted to define a threshold
standard of clarity for such requests, and have
held that requests falling below this threshold do
not trigger the right to counsel. (3) Still
others have adopted a third approach, holding that
when an accused makes an equivocal statement that
"arguably" can be construed as a request for
counsel, all interrogation must immediately cease
except for narrow questions designed to "clarify"
the earlier statement and the accused's desires
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respecting counsel.
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. at 96 n. 3 (citations omitted).
In State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1988), this
Court adopted the third option indicated in the United States
Supreme Court's opinion of Smith v. Illinois.

This Court noted:

We therefore adopt the clarification approach and
hold that when an accused makes an arguably
equivocal request for counsel during custodial
interrogation, further questioning must be limited
to clarifying the request. If the request is
clarified as a present desire for assistance of
counsel, all questioning must cease as if an
initial unambiguous request had been made. If,
however, the accused, absent police persuasion,
indicates he does not want counsel present at that
time, the interrogation may continue.
State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d at 969.

In State v. Griffin, the

exchange between the appellant and the interrogator was as follows:
GRIFFIN: [responding to the specific
allegations] This is a lie. I'm calling an
attorney.
DET. STRONG: OK, are you saying you don't want to
talk anymore?
GRIFFIN: No, I ain't saying that, I'm just saying
it's a lie. I am going to talk to an attorney.
Id. at 966-67.

The Court found that the appellant's remarks

constituted an equivocal request for counsel; the Court then found,
however, that police interrogators appropriately clarified the
request.
In this case, Carlos Sampson arrived, at the request of
the police, at the Ninth Floor of the Metropolitan Hall of Justice
to submit to a polygraph examination on November 25, 1986, at
11:15 a.m. (PHT. 94). The examiner, a Sgt. Syd Elliott, spent
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substantial time explaining the polygraph and its history to
Mr. Sampson (R. 116-19).

Mr. Elliott then explained that this

polygraph examination was
being conducted in conjunction with a criminal
matter, that is a police report. Because you are
in the cop shop, there is no doubt in your mind
that this is the police station, and, because you
are taking a polygraph from a law enforcement
agency, I must advise you of your rights again.
(R. 119). Sgt. Elliott then read Mr. Sampson his Miranda rights.
After reading Mr. Sampson his rights, Sgt. Elliott asked
if Carlos understood the rights.

Mr. Sampson replied, "yes."

Then

the following colloquy occurred:
SGT. ELLIOTT: OK. Having these rights in mind,
do you wish to talk to me now?
SAMPSON: Well, uh, should I have a lawyer, I
mean, well, I'm really not worried about anything,
it is just that . . . ."
ELLIOTT: OK, if you are not worried about
anything, I would say that is fine, let's go ahead
and proceed. Let's get this thing done and get it
over with and see what we can do.
SAMPSON:

I'm willing to get it over with.

(R. 120). The polygraph examination then continued to its
conclusion, after which Sgt. Elliott escorted Mr. Sampson to the
captain's office where Sheriff N. D. "Pete" Hayward was located
(PHT. 99-100).

Sheriff Hayward returned with Mr. Sampson to the

interrogation room and continued questioning Mr. Sampson.

Sheriff

Hayward did not read Mr. Sampson his Miranda rights (PHT. 80).
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A.

THE INTERROGATION OF MR. SAMPSON WAS CUSTODIAL.

The threshold question, as outlined above, is whether
this interrogation session was custodial so that the Miranda
protections attached.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 461.

"By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way."

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444.

"Interrogation," as subsequently defined, includes "not
only . . . express questioning, but also any words or actions on the
part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect."

Rhode

Island v. Innes, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
The same concerns for self-incrimination that attend a
routine custodial-questioning session are present during a lie
detector test, in which anything a defendant says can be used
against him.

State v. Wright, 477 A.2d 1265, 1269 (M.J. 1984).

The

Supreme Court of New Jersey, in a case involving the custodial
nature of a polygraph test, stated, "We find little merit in the
State's suggestion that questioning that takes place before, during,
or after a lie detector test is somehow materially different from
'custodial interrogation.'"

_Id. at 1268-69.

Moreover, the United

States Supreme Court, in the case of Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42,
47 (1983), accepted the premise that a polygraph test is
interrogation.
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The context in which Mr. Sampson found himself during the
polygraph examination and subsequent interrogation was custodial.
Mr. Sampson was instructed to show up at the police station, and,
upon arrival, he was taken to an eight-foot by ten-foot
interrogation room occupied by one desk and two chairs (PHT. 77).
Sgt. Syd Elliott explained the polygraph test, reminding Mr. Sampson
that he was "in the cop shop" and "taking a polygraph from a law
enforcement agency" (R. 119). Sgt. Elliott then read Mr. Sampson
his rights (R. 120). Sgt. Elliott remained with Mr. Sampson the
entire time he was there, only leaving him when he surrendered
custody of him to the Sheriff, Pete Hayward (PHT. 92).
Additionally, Sgt. Elliott testified at the preliminary
hearing that Mr. Sampson was a suspect from the outset of the
examination and that suspicions against Mr. Sampson increased during
the interrogation (PHT. 100-01).

Sgt. Elliott also testified that

he did not know whether Mr. Sampson could have left.

Furthermore,

during cross-examination with Sheriff Hayward, the Sheriff also
admitted that he possibly would not have let Mr. Sampson leave had
he so desired.

All of this information plus the subjective

understanding of Mr. Sampson indicates that he was in custody and
that he was not free to leave and break up police questioning.
Therefore, Mr. Sampson was, in fact, under a custodial interrogation
and the Miranda protections attached.
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B.

MR. SAMPSON INVOKED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL.

Although Mr. Sampson's statement, "Well, uh, should I
have a lawyer, I mean, well, I'm really not worried about anything,
it is just that . . . ," fell short of being an unequivocal request
for counsel, the statement reaches the level of an ambiguous and
equivocal request or invocation of the right to counsel.

This fact

is especially true in light of the fact that Sgt. Elliott actually
interrupted the completion of Mr. Sampson's statement when he
stated, "OK, if you are not worried about anything, I would say that
is fine, let's go ahead and proceed . . . ." (R. 120).
Numerous opinions address the nature and types of
equivocal requests for counsel.

In White v. Finkbeiner, 611 F.2d

186 (7th Cir. 1979), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
stated that a request for counsel need not be explicit.

Relying on

the "if the accused indicates in any manner" language of Miranda,
that court stated that "[t]o require a person in custody to be even
more specific would be to ignore the language in Miranda . . . ."
White v. Finkbeiner, 611 F.2d at 190.

The accused's statement found

to be equivocal in Finkbeiner was, "in some form, 'I'd rather see an
attorney.'"
Other statements by an accused being interrogated which
were found to be equivocal are:
lawyer?"

"Maybe it would be good to have a

United States v. Prestigiacomo, 504 F.Supp. 681, (E.D.N.Y.

1981); "Why should I not get an attorney?"

United States v. Cherry,

773 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1979); "Maybe I should have an attorney."
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Maglio v, Jago, 580 F.2d 202, 205 (6th Cir. 1978); "I had better
talk to a lawyer."

United States v. Clark, 499 F.2d 802, 805 (4th

Cir. 1974); "Might want to talk to a lawyer."

United States v.

Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1985); "I would like to have a
lawyer, but I'd rather talk to you."

Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513,

516 (5th Cir. 1979); "Do you think I need an attorney?"

State v.

Smith, 661 P.2d 1001, 1003 (Wash. App. 1983); and "When do you think
I'll get to see a lawyer?"

Hall v. State, 326 S.E.2d 812, 818 (Ga.

1985).
In comparison, the statement of Mr. Sampson—irrespective
of the interruption by Sgt. Elliott—is an equivocal request for
counsel.

To require more of a young man under the charge of police

for the first time in his life (twenty-six years old) would limit
the protections of the fifth amendment to only those who are most
assertive and articulate; all others would be incapable of
effectively exercising their fifth amendment rights.

Hampel v.

State, 706 P.2d 1173 (Alaska 1985).
As this Court noted in State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965
(Utah App. 1988) ,
[W]hen an accused makes an arguably equivocal
request for counsel during custodial
interrogation, further questioning must be limited
to clarifying that request.
Id. at 969.

Other courts agree:

[W]henever even an equivocal request for an
attorney is made by a suspect during custodial
interrogation, the scope of that interrogation is
immediately narrowed to one subject and one only.
Further questioning thereafter must be limited to
clarifying that request until it is clarified.

- 21 -

Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1979) (emphasis in
original) (citing Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. en banc
1979)).
In United States v. Cherry, 773 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir.
1984), the Fifth Circuit reiterated, with emphasis, its earlier
theme:
No statement taken after an equivocal request is
made and before it is clarified as an effective
waiver of the present assistance of counsel can
clear the Miranda bar.
773 F.2d at 1131 (emphasis in original).

In Cherry, the Court found

that the defendant's murder confession was given only after agents
failed to clarify the defendant's equivocal request for counsel.
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit Court reversed the lower court who
erroneously had admitted the confession into evidence.

Cherry, 773

F.2d at 1131-32.
By interrupting and cutting off Mr. Sampson's equivocal
request for counsel, Sgt. Syd Elliott was far afield from the only
permissible area of clarification.

Sgt. Elliott's response to

Mr. Sampson was as follows:
SAMPSON: Well, uh, should I have a lawyer, I
mean, well, I'm really not worried about anything,
it is just that . . . .
ELLIOTT: OK, if you are not worried about
anything, I would say that is fine, let's go ahead
and proceed. Let's get this thing done and get it
over with and see what we can do.
(R. 120). This response is not clarification; rather, the response
was persuasion and presumption.

As such, the response was

impermissible under the fifth amendment protections as designated by
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this Court.

In State v. Griffin, this Court indicated:
If . . . the accused, absent police persuasion,
indicates he does not want counsel present at that
time, the interrogation may continue.

754 P.2d at 969 (emphasis added).

Sgt. Elliott did not clarify

Mr. Sampson's request for counsel.

Sgt. Elliott impermissibly

persuaded Mr. Sampson to proceed despite his concern.

Consistent

with State v. Griffin, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has
stated, "[S]uch measures [persuasion and presumption] are foreign to
the purpose of clarification, which is not to persuade but to
discern."

Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d at 772.
Other courts are also in agreement.

One court stated

that persuasion and presumption "constitutes a subtle temptation to
the unsophisticated, indigent accused to forego the right to counsel
at this critical moment."

United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey,

467 F.2d 1248, 1250 (7th Cir. 1972).

Yet another court explained:

[T]he need to avoid any undue influence or
coercive effect on the accusedfs right to request
the presence of counsel during an interrogation
makes it imperative that certain limits be placed
on the manner in which ambiguous or equivocal
questions concerning the availability of counsel
may be answered. We believe those limits are
exceeded when an interrogating officer chooses to
answer a question in a way which the officer knows
or should know will be reasonably likely to
discourage the accused from asserting the right to
counsel.
Hampel v. State, 706 P.2d 1173, 1181 (Alaska 1985).
Sgt. Syd Elliott's failure to clarify Mr. Sampson's
equivocal request for counsel was error.

He exacerbated that error

by persuading Mr. Sampson to refrain from invoking his right.
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His

actions belittled the importance of the right to counsel.

In one

breath, Sgt. Elliott informed Mr. Sampson of his right to counsel,
then in the next breath, he presumed its insignificance and
persuaded against its invocation.

Sgt. Elliott was under an

obligation to clarify the remark of Mr. Sampson; he failed to do
so.

Accordingly, Sgt. Elliott, and then Sheriff Hayward who relied

on Sgt. Elliott's erroneous behavior, violated the fifth amendment's
protective prohibition on further interrogation without clarifying
an arguably equivocal invocation of the right to counsel.

C. AFTER EQUIVOCALLY INVOKING THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL, MR. SAMPSON DID NOT LATER WAIVE THAT
RIGHT.
Although the burden to show waiver rests with the State,
see, e.g., State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985),
Mr. Sampson's statements cannot be twisted to show a waiver.
Because Sgt. Elliott failed to clarify the equivocal request and
merely proceeded with inadmissible interrogation, subsequent
statements flowing from that interrogation are incapable of passing
the Miranda bar.

United States v. Cherry, 733 F.2d at 1131; see,

e.g., Hampel v. State, 706 P.2d at 1180-81 (unless statements are
clarified, responses to subsequent interrogation is subject to grave
doubt).

Additionally, the facts of this case do not support a later

waiver.
The closest thing to a waiver in this case would be the
statement following Sgt. Elliott's interruption wherein Mr. Sampson
stated, "I'm willing to get it over with" (R. 120). Mr. Sampson, at
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Sgt. Elliott's urging, then signed the waiver form (R. 121).
However, as stated earlier, the State has the burden of proving that
the waiver was voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; State v. Moore, 697 P.2d at 236.

"That

burden becomes far more difficult, if not impossible, to sustain
when the record shows that a request for counsel was made which was
not honored before questioning continued."

Maglio v. Jago, 580 F.2d

202, 205 (6th Cir. 1978); see also United States v. Heldt, 745 F.2d
1275, 1278 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. Vandusen, 431
F.2d 1278, 1280 (1st Cir. 1970)) (burden increases when confusion is
apparent).
Furthermore, courts view a waiver which follows so soon
after the initial request as suspect.
F.2d 186, 193 (7th Cir. 1979).

White

v. Finkbeiner, 611

Courts, with fundamental rights at

stake, must interpret equivocal statements in the light most
favorable to the accused, Ld. at 190, and courts also indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver.

United States v. Cherry, 733

F.2d 1124, 1131 (pet. cert. 1984) (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387, 404 (1977)).
Finally, a valid waiver cannot be established by showing
only that the accused responded to further police-initiated
custodial interrogation.

Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984)

(citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981)).
As Sgt. Elliott made no attempt to clarify Mr. Sampson's
request for an attorney but rather responded in a manner to persuade
against the invocation of that right and to diminish the importance
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of that right, the State cannot meet their burden of showing a valid
waiver.

Accordingly, the subsequent statements of Mr. Sampson as

well as the evidence derived from those statements were inadmissible
at trial and should have been suppressed.

The trial court's ruling

to the contrary, admitting those statements, and evidence derived
from those statements, was prejudicial error.
The trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting
not only polygraph statements but also statements and derivative
evidence obtained through the post-polygraph interrogation session
conducted by Sheriff Hayward.

The Sheriff had not renewed the

Miranda warnings with Mr. Sampson nor had he obtained a waiver;
rather, he mistakenly relied upon the constitutionally infirm waiver
obtained by Sgt. Elliott (PHT. 80). Therefore, all evidence derived
from the statements were also inadmissible and should have been
suppressed.

It was prejudicial error for the trial court to fail to

grant Mr. Sampson's pre-trial motion to suppress.

D. MR. SAMPSON'S STATEMENTS TO DETECTIVE JUDD ON
NOVEMBER 25, 1986, WERE ADMITTED IN VIOLATION OF
THE MIRANDA PROTECTIONS.
On November 25, 1986, following the discovery of Miyako's
body, Police Detective Dick Judd conducted an interrogation of
Carlos Sampson on the Ninth Floor of the Hall of Justice at
4:50 p.m.

This interrogation session, in toto, is violative of

Miranda and is progeny because the police, not Mr. Sampson,
initiated the questioning.

Accordingly, all statements flowing from

the interrogation should be suppressed and held inadmissible at
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trial.
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. at 484-85, holds
unequivocally that "an accused . . . having expressed his desire to
deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations wit h the police."
cases have upheld that position.

Later

In Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. at

95, the Court stated:
[I]f
[13
f the accused invoked his right to counsel,
courts may admit his responses to further
questioning only on a finding that h£ (a)
furthe discussions'with the police, and
initiated further
(b) knowingly an
and intelligently waived the right
he had invoked.
(citing Edwards v, Arizona, 451 U.S. at 484-85) (emphasis added).
In State v. Moor
Moore, 697 P.2d 233 (Utah 1985), this Court
reiterated this position st
stating:
[A]n accused's s
statements made after he has
right to counsel and before counsel is
invoked his righ
made available tto him are admissible if three
conditions are s
satisfied. First, it must be the
accused, not the law enforcement officers, who
initiates the co
conversations in which the
incriminating st
statements are made. Second, . . .
Id. at 236.

Mr. Sampson in
invoked his right t o counsel earlier this

same day (see subpoint B of this point, supra).

Since he did not

later waive that invocation of his rights (see subpoint C, supra),
the police were in error to initiate this interrogation session.
The statements made during the session should have been suppressed
at trial.

The trial court erred in admitting the statements and all
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derivative evidence.
The recent case of Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51 (1985),
supports this position.

In Shea, the United States Supreme Court

was examining whether Edwards v. Arizona applied retroactively to
cases still pending on direct appeal in state courts.
Louisiana, 470 U.S. at 52.

Shea v.

The facts of the case, however, are

similar to the case now at bar.

Petitioner Shea had been arrested

for two counts of Armed Robbery and was taken to the police
station.

At the station, his Miranda rights were read to him and he

signed a standard Miranda card.

He then invoked his right to

counsel and police appropriately terminated the interview.
The following afternoon before Shea had spoken with an
attorney, a police officer returned and informed Shea that he would
be transferred to another jail.

Then, without any indication from

petitioner that he was willing to be interrogated, the officer asked
if Shea wanted to talk about the case.

Miranda rights were again

read to Shea, who again signed the Miranda card.

Shea then gave an

oral confession that he had committed the two robberies.

Shea v.

Louisiana, 470 U.S. at 52.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, that court
held that an Edwards violation had occurred when the police had
initiated a second interrogation which produced the confession.
That court also held, however, that Edwards v. Arizona would not
apply retroactively.

Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. at 53-54.

The

case was then appealed to the United States Supreme Court and
certiorari was granted to decide the issue of retroactivity of
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Edwards v. Arizona.

Shea, 470 U.S. at 54.

Important to the instant

case is that all parties in Shea agreed that an Edwards violation
occurred on the facts as stated.

Shea, 470 U.S. at 53 n. 1.

The circumstances of Mr. Sampson's case very closely
parallel the Shea facts.

The only distinction is that after

Mr. Sampson invoked his right to counsel during the polygraph
interrogation, the officer ignored the request and continued the
interrogation.

This distinction, however, is insignificant as in

Edwards v. Arizona, the Supreme Court stated:
[W]e now hold that when an accused has invoked his
right to have counsel present during custodial
interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot
be established by showing only that he responded
to further police-initiated custodial
interrogation even if he has been advised of his
rights.
451 U.S. at 484 (footnote omitted).

Therefore, the fact that

Mr. Sampson continued answering questions during the polygraph and
post-polygraph interrogation sessions is insignificant.

Also

insignificant is the fact that Mr. Sampson again signed the waiver
form prior to a second interrogation session.

As in Shea v.

Louisiana, the mere fact that police initiated the subsequent
interrogation session is violative of Mr. Sampson's rights, and all
statements flowing therefrom must be suppressed.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court's
erroneous denial of the motion to suppress.

Mr. Sampson's

conviction should therefore be reversed and a new trial ordered.
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POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO REMOVE FOR CAUSE TWO
JURORS WHO ADMITTED THE INABILITY TO BE IMPARTIAL.
Following individual voir dire of the jury panel, counsel
for both sides challenged several jurors for cause (R. 364 at
151-158).

Mr. Sampson urges that the trial court committed

reversible error in failing to grant the challenges for cause of two
jurors.

He insists these errors violated his substantial rights and

require reversal of his conviction and a new trial.
The sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution
afford an accused the right to a trial by an impartial jury.

The

Utah Legislature has complied with these constitutional mandates by
providing an accused with the right to challenge a juror for actual
bias and remove that juror from the panel.
P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 1977).

State v. Brooks, 563

By statute, Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-18(e)

(1953 as amended), a particular juror may be challenged for cause
whenever, inter alia, the juror has formed an opinion as to the
guilt or innocence of the accused or whenever the juror has a state
of mind with reference to either the cause or a party which will
prevent the juror from acting impartially and without prejudice to
the substantial rights of the challenging party.

See Addendum A for

pertinent text of the statute.
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized that the
procedural rule and the Utah Constitution are violated and that
reversal of subsequent convictions is required whenever a trial
court fails to excuse a biased juror for cause thereby forcing the
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accused to utilize a peremptory challenge to remove the juror.

See

State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1987), and cases cited
therein.

Recently the Court has reiterated that, once the inference

of impartiality or prejudice of a juror is revealed, an abuse of the
trial court's discretion may occur unless (1) that juror is removed
from the panel or (2) the inference of impartiality is rebutted.
State v. Cobb, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 43, 44 (Utah 1989) (citing
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988)).

"Impartiality1' is

defined as "a mental attitude of appropriate indifference."

Id.

The Supreme Court has further instructed that the
inference of bias must be rebutted by demonstrating that such bias
"was merely a 'light impression1, not one which would 'close the
mind against the testimony that may be offered in opposition.1"
State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980).

Again, the failure

to either remove the juror or to investigate further until the
inference of bias is rebutted constitutes an abuse of discretion by
the trial court.

_I<3. These standards outlined by the Supreme

Court, and recognized and adopted by this Court, State v. Wilson,
105 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 23 (Utah App. 1989), are analytically
reinforced by the rationale announced in Jenkins v. Parrish, 627
P.2d 533 (Utah 1981), where the Court instructed that the exercise
of the trial court's discretion is to be viewed "in light of the
fact that it is a simple matter to obviate any problem of bias
simply by excusing the prospective juror and selecting another."
Id. at 536.
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A.

JUROR BELL

Mr. Sampson insists the trial court abused its discretion
in denying the challenge for cause of juror Connie Rae Bell, forcing
him to exercise a peremptory challenge to correct that error and
remove her from the panel.
An examination of the individual voir dire of Mrs. Bell
reveals that her remarks unveiled a facial question of her bias
and/or prejudice.

That voir dire discussion further reveals that

those remarks went unrebutted as the trial court did not
rehabilitate Mrs. Bell.

Accordingly, the court necessarily should

have excused Mrs. Bell for cause, and the failure to do so was
reversible error.
The entire individual voir dire of Mrs. Bell is as
follows:
JUDGE YOUNG: Mrs. Bell, the reason we brought you
[in] individually is because we wanted to have the
opportunity to discuss anything that would be of
concern to you in considering this case as to
whether you could consider it fairly and
impartially. First, I've indicated earlier that
the crime involved the victim, a 19-month-old
child. The body was recovered from a dumpster.
Does that—obviously no one would enjoy sitting on
a case like this, but would the fact of a
19-month-old child cause you for any reason to
feel you could not be fair and impartial in
rendering a decision in this case?
MRS. BELL:
JUDGE YOUNG:
would be?

Kind of.
What is the basis you think that

MRS. BELL: Just because I think I know kids can
get on your nerves and they can just be trying at
times, but I think there's always something you
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can do to take 'em somewhere or, you know, if they
were that—I don't know what the situation was.
JUDGE YOUNG: Let's suppose that there is a
situation where a parent disciplines a child in
such a way that the parent doesn't realize the
magnitude of that discipline but that the child
dies, the parent didn't intend that death. If you
knew that and believed that would that allow you
to be able to find the defendant is not guilty of
that crime?
MRS. BELL: Yeah, I guess, if he really didn't
think, or whomever it was, didn't think that they
was harming, but I think any time--a baby is so
fragile. Any time that you start hitting it
you've got to know it's going to hurt it some way.
JUDGE YOUNG: Do you feel that you could be fair
and impartial in considering the evidence when the
evidence is presented in this case?
MRS. BELL:
JUDGE YOUNG:
MRS. BELL:

I'd try.
All right.
That's all I could say.

I don't know—

JUDGE YOUNG: Have you heard of this case in the
media before?
MRS. BELL: No, it doesn't come to my mind. We
talk about things at work but this one really
doesn't come to mind.
JUDGE YOUNG:
MRS. BELL:
JUDGE YOUNG:

What is your education?
12th Grade.
High school graduate?

MRS. BELL: High school.
day classes.

I went to Trade Tech for

JUDGE YOUNG: Is there any reason you believe, if
you were accused of this crime, that someone with
your views should not sit in this jury?
MRS. BELL:
JUDGE YOUNG:

I guess not.
Any questions from the prosecution?
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MS. LEWIS:
JUDGE YOUNG:
MR. VALDEZ:

No, nothing.
From the defense?
I have none.

MS. BOWMAN: Does the fact that you have a baby
that's 17 months old and the fact that the victim
in this case was 19 months old raise a particular
concern with you?
MRS. BELL: Well, that's why I say it would be
hard for me to think because I know they can be
trying, they do get on your nerves and its hard
but I just think you would know if you was hurting
the baby. I mean, I just think you would know.
JUDGE YOUNG:

All right.

Thank you, Mrs. Bell.

(Whereupon, Mrs. Lott was brought in to chambers).

(JS.

88-90).
Following voir dire, Mr. Sampson moved to excuse

Mrs. Bell for cause, noting:
MR. VALDEZ [defense co-counsel]: Yes, we'd
challenge juror No. 6, Connie Bell. She indicated
several times that she could not be impartial,
that she could try but it would be very hard to be
impartial.
MS. BOWMAN [defense co-counsel]: I think you
would know if you hurt the baby. She said, "I
think you'd know if you were hurting a baby."
MR. VALDEZ: Coupled with the fact she has a
17-month-old child. I think that would probably
add to the impartiality of her decision and I
think she, to quote her, "It would be hard to be
impartial in this case." In fact, several times
she said she can't be impartial.
(JS. 152).
The trial court later ruled on the challenge of
Mrs. Bell, stating:
JUDGE YOUNG: Let me tell you what I will do.
Connie Rae Bell, No. 6, I will not excuse for
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cause. I acknowledge she said she felt she could
not be impartial, she said he had difficulty, but
I felt she was rehabilitated in her other
responses.
(JS. 156). Contrary to the court's assertion, Mrs. Bell was never
fully rehabilitated.

The inference of bias remained unrebutted and

was not of "light impression" but rather was central to the issue of
whether Mr. Sampson may have knowingly murdered his daughter
Miyako.

Mrs. Bell's repeated comments—and final word on the

matter—were that "You would know if you was hurting the baby.

I

mean I just think you would know" (JS. 90). Such comments indicate
the bias of Mrs. Bell was a "strong and deep emotion" which would
prevent her from acting impartially and without prejudice to the
substantial rights of Mr. Sampson.

See State v. Wilson, 105 Utah

Adv. Rep. at 23; Rule 18(e)(14), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
(1980) .
Because the court did not excuse Mrs. Bell from the
venire nor rehabilitate her expressions of the inability to be
impartial, the court abused its discretion.
Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 26 (Utah 1984).

See, e.g., State v.

As Mr. Sampson was then

required to waste a peremptory challenge to correct that which the
trial court should have done (R. 271), he suffered prejudice and his
conviction must be reversed.

B.

JUROR ERICKSON

Following individual voir dire, both the State and
Mr. Sampson challenged juror Helen F. Erickson for cause.
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Defense

counsel urged:
We go on to juror #10, Helen Erickson, who
basically said she was a grandma and it would
impair her ability to be impartial. She felt
children are so innocent that they should not be
hurt. I think the court did a little
rehabilitation on her but I think she was very
reluctant to sit as a juror because she felt she
could not render a fair and impartial decision
(JS. 153).
The State concurred in the challenge for cause indicating, "With
reference to [No.] 10 I believe her answer was that she feels she
couldn't be fair.

That's what my note says.

So I'd have to agree"

(JS. 156). The court ruled:
JUDGE YOUNG: You are both joining in the request
then on 10. However, I will not grant it in
relation to 10. I think you'll have to use a
peremptory challenge on 10. I don't think the
expression of her concern she is a grandmother,
she is a concerned person, but I don't think that
expression was sufficient for me to dismiss for
cause (JS. 156).
The individual voir dire of juror Erickson was as follows:
JUDGE YOUNG: Please have a seat. The reason we
brought you in with the other jurors individually
is that we want to provide maximum opportunity for
anybody to state anything that would be of concern
in dealing with this case. Would the fact that
this case involves a 19-month-old child and the
fact that the child's body was recovered from a
dumpster impair your ability to sit in judgment in
this case?
MRS. ERICKSON:

I think so.

JUDGE YOUNG: All right. Now, nobody would enjoy
the experience of sitting in a difficult case such
as this that has that kind of fact situation, but
do you believe that you could not be fair and
impartial in considering the evidence simply
because the child was of that age?
MRS. ERICKSON:

Yes.
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JUDGE YOUNG:

Why?

MRS. ERICKSON: 'Cause they are so innocent and
just can't understand it,
JUDGE YOUNG:

And that would be hard for you?

MRS. ERICKSON:

Uh-huh.

JUDGE YOUNG: Nonetheless, if you believe that
that event did occur and—would you be able to
convict the defendant of it?
MRS. ERICKSON:
one.

I don't know.

It would be a tough

JUDGE YOUNG: If you believe the event did not
occur would you be able to acquit the defendant?
MRS. ERICKSON:
involved?

You mean if it wasn't a child

JUDGE YOUNG: Nof if you believed the event did
not occur as prosecuted by the State, that they
did not bear their burden of proof, would you be
able to find the defendant not guilty?
MRS. ERICKSON:

I guess.

JUDGE YOUNG: Have you seen or heard anything of
this case in the media?
MRS. ERICKSON:
JUDGE YOUNG:
MRS. ERICKSON:

No, nothing.

What is your education?
High school.

JUDGE YOUNG: Other than what you have stated
previously, if you were accused of this offense,
would there be any reason you would not want
someone with your mind, set or disposition to sit
in judgment of you?
MRS. ERICKSON:
to me.
JUDGE YOUNG:

I just can't imagine it happening
Thank you, Mrs. Erickson.

(JS. 96-98).
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As with juror Bell previously, the trial court refused to
excuse this juror after she had indicated she could not be fair and
impartial.

Mrs. Erickson was not successfully rehabilitated.

the State concurred in the challenge for cause.

Even

Inasmuch as the

judge did not excuse her nor rehabilitate her, he abused his
discretion when he failed to grant the challenge for cause requiring
that Mr. Sampson utilize a peremptory challenge to remove her from
the jury.
Mr. Sampson's peremptory challenges were otherwise
utilized, and Mrs. Erickson actually sat as a juror in this case
establishing that prejudice inhered to Mr. Sampson by the trial
court's abuse of discretion in failing to excuse her for cause.
Exacerbating the court's error in failing to dismiss juror Erickson
for cause on the basis of her voir dire responses is the fact that
the State had joined in the assessment of the need to excuse the
juror for cause.

Therefore, the court's failure to remove juror

Erickson violated the clear instruction of Utah case law indicating
"it is a simple matter [for the court] to obviate any problem of
bias simply by excusing the prospective juror and selecting
another."

Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d at 536.
Because the trial court failed to excuse either or both

Mrs. Bell and Mrs. Erickson, Mr. Sampson's substantial rights were
violated and his conviction must be reversed and his case remanded
to the trial court for a new trial.
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POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT ADMITTED OVER OBJECTION PREJUDICIAL
PHOTOGRAPHS AND SLIDES OF THE DEAD CHILD'S BODY.
The admission into evidence of prejudicial photographs is
governed at base by Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

That

rule states:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983).

However, Utah case law has

extended some categories of evidence beyond the rulefs balancing of
probativeness versus unfair prejudicial effect.

The Supreme Court

has indicated:
[0]ur past decisions have recognized that inherent
in certain categories of relevant evidence is an
unusually strong propensity to unfairly prejudice,
inflame, or mislead a jury. Evidence in these
categories is uniquely subject to being used to
distort the deliberative process and improperly
skew the outcome.
State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1256 (Utah 1988).

The Court has

concluded that gruesome photographs of a homicide victim's corpse
must be placed in this unique category of evidence.

State v. Cloud,

722 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1986), and State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60,
63-64 (Utah 1983).

The Court consequently decided that:

when evidence falling within such a category is
offered, we have required a showing of unusual
probative value before it is admissible under rule
403. In the absence of such a showing the
probative value of such evidence is presumed to be
"substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice."
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State v, Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1256.
Accordingly, gruesome photographs of the victim must meet
a threshold requirement of "essentiality" even before the Rule 403
balancing occurs.

See State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d at 752.

"Essentiality11 is defined as that evidence which conveys relevant
information that cannot readily be presented by less potentially
prejudicial means.

^Id.

Only after establishing the essentiality of

gruesome photographs does the inquiry turn to the balancing of
probativeness versus unfair prejudice.
Under Rule 403's balancing test, "unfair prejudice" means
more than having an adverse effect on the party's case.

Most

evidence offered by an opponent will have such an effect.

"Unfair

prejudice," rather, means "an undue tendency to suggest decision on
an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional
one."

Advisory Committee Note to Rule 403, Federal Rules of

Evidence (1975).

Unfair prejudice may be determined by examining:

whether the evidentiary value of what the photograph conveys can be
put before the jury readily and accurately by other means not
accompanied by the potential prejudice; whether the photographs are
black and white or in color; whether the photographs are closeups or
enlargements; whether the facts of the case are disputed by the
defendant; the degree of gruesomeness of the photographs; the
cumulative nature of the evidence; and when the photographs were
taken in relation to the crime.

State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1257

(citing State v. Cloud, 722 P.d at 752-54; State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d
at 63-64; State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810, 812-13 (Utah 1979); State v.
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Ross, 501 P.2d 632, 635-36 (Utah 1972); State v. Poe, 471 P.2d 870,
872 (Utah 1970); State v. Poe, 441 P.2d 512, 514-15 (Utah 1968)).
Finally, the responsibility of weighing relevance against
prejudice is that of the trial judge, and his decision should not be
overturned unless it is shown to be an abuse of discretion.
State v. Poe I, 441 P.2d at 515.

Once error is determined to have

occurred, the reviewing court must assess whether that error is
prejudicial or harmless.

State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d at 754.

That

determination is measured by examining whether the error likely
affected the substantial rights of the defendant.

Id.

(citing

Rule 103(a), Utah Rules of Evidence (1983); and Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-35-30(a)).

The Utah Supreme Court has recently clarified this

language to mean reversal is required when there is a reasonable
likelihood that the error complained of affected the outcome of the
trial.

State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989).
In this case, the prosecutors indicated an intent to

introduce photographs, slides and a video tape into evidence.
Mr. Sampson objected urging that most of the photographs, the slides
and the video tape were not essentially relevant, insisting that
they be excluded inasmuch as they were more prejudicial than
probative.

The trial court excluded the video tape.

However, over

the objection of defense counsel, the trial court admitted the
photographs and the slides (T. 394, 451, 452, 459, 583-84, 587-88).
A continuing objection was granted to the admission of the
photographs and the slides (T. 450-51).
Mr. Sampson now asserts that the trial court abused its
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discretion when it permitted the photographs and slides to reach the
jury.

Specifically, (A) the photographs and the slides failed to

meet the threshold requirement of essentiality; and, even where
essentiality might have been met, (B) the photographs and slides
were not more probative than prejudicial (they failed the base test
of Rule 403) because (1) their only purpose was to inflame and
arouse the sympathies of the jury and they had no evidentiary value
except for that hoped-for emotional impact on the jury; (2) the
photographs and slides were unnecessarily cumulative; (3) the
photographs and slides functioned to confuse the issues before the
jury; (4) the photographs and slides presented misleading
information to the jury; and (5) the photographs and slides were
unduly emphasized by the State in prosecuting this case.

A. THE PHOTOGRAPHS AND SLIDES FAILED TO MEET THE
THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT OF ESSENTIALITY.
In State v. Cloud, the Utah Supreme Court reversed a
Second Degree Homicide conviction because of the erroneous admission
into evidence of gruesome photographs.

The major error noted by the

Court was that the State urged and the trial court applied an
erroneous standard; the requisite finding of essential evidentiary
value was never established despite defense urgings of that
necessity.

State v. Cloud, 722 P.d at 753.

In this case,

Mr. Sampson also urged on more than one occasion that the
photographs and slides proffered by the State suffered from the same
frailty, a lack of essential evidentiary value (T. 362-64, 551). As
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in State v. Cloud, the trial court accepted the State's claim of
mere relevance to be enough.
This Court should find on the facts of this case that the
photograph exhibits numbered 8-11 and 14-22 and all sixteen of the
slides were admitted in error because they lacked essential
evidentiary value.

The photographs and slides of Miyako at the

dumpster scene, including inside the garbage sack, and the
photographs of her autopsy did not establish a critical element that
the State was required to prove.
The State suggested that the photographs and slides were
important to establish mental state and that the photographs were
simply not gruesome (T. 361-62).

Both claims fail.

First, the photographs and slides, as in State v. Cloud,
do not establish mental state in any way.

Cf. State v. Cloud, 722

P.2d at 753-54 (where the Supreme Court found that the critical
issue of mental state, urged as intentional murder—second
degree—by the State, or extreme emotional distress—manslaughter—
by the defense, was not advanced in any way by the photographs); see
also State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214, 1221 (Utah 1985) (where the
Supreme Court ruled that "the reprehensible conduct of the defendant
subsequent to [the victim's] death" was beyond the moment which
subjected him to a charge of criminal homicide).
The trial court, at the State's urging and over the
objections of the defense, found the cause of death to be at issue
in the case (T. 553, 557-59).

The court made the above findings

despite the defense's willingness to stipulate to the cause of death
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(T. 558) even though it had never really been at issue (T. 550).
The trial court then found that the photographs and slides would be
admissible regardless of such a stipulation (T. 558-59).

The

ruling, therefore, was erroneous as no issue was advanced by the
admission of the photographs and slides.
Second, the State's contention that the photographs and
slides were not gruesome is wrong.

The State argued that:

under the Cloud case that those photographs, 8 and
9 in particular, these simply are not gruesome
photographs. They aren't bloody. This person is
not—they don't show wounds. So in terms of
weighing prejudicial effect I think that we would
argue that this is not the type of gruesome
photograph that courts have been concerned about
excluding . . .(T. 362).
This interpretation misses the point of excluding photographs.
"Gruesome" is not narrowly defined to just bloody photographs;
rather, "gruesome," at base, focuses on the effect the photograph
will have on the jury, i.e., whether the photograph "inflames or
arouses the jury."

State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d at 752-53.

The term "gruesome" is defined as horribly repugnant or
grisly.

The Random House College Dictionary, revised edition

(1984).

Synonyms of "gruesome" are listed as shocking, horrid,

distasteful, objectionable, and offensive.

Jld.

Examining the

photographs and slides admitted into evidence leaves little doubt
that they fit within the definition of gruesome.

Photographs of a

small, naked, 18-month-old child laying dead among the trash in a
garbage bag (Nos. 8 and 9) and immediately after removal from the
bag while laying in a state of rigor mortis (Nos. 10 and 11) are
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gruesome.

So, toof are autopsy photographs depicting the bruised

frail body of the dead child from various angles, including
photographs of internal organs pictured both in the natural setting
of the body and removed therefrom (Exhibits Nos. 14-22 and slides
Nos. 1-16).
Importantly, even the prosecutors and the trial court
noted the "gruesome," inflammatory and arousing nature of the
photographs.

At one point, the following discussion occurred:

JUDGE YOUNG: Do you think it would be helpful if
there were an explanation given to the jury in
advance of these photographs that some are
extremely explicit and are difficult to see?
MS. LEWIS: I think it's an excellent thing.
think it is very appropriate.

I

JUDGE YOUNG: It seems to me that this photograph
[photograph exhibit No. 22, slide No. 7 ] , for one
not familiar with the course of procedures in an
autopsy, can create concern and stress.
(T. 535). Later the prosecutor inquired, n I wonder if we might also
inquire of the people in the courtroom if they feel they are capable
of handling this portion of the testimony [the slides] so that we
don't have someone get sick or whatever in the audience" (T. 559).
A final and critical consideration in determining the
essentiality of photographs and slides is assessed by factoring in
whether the allegedly key information can be provided to the jury in
less potentially prejudicial means.
752.

State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d at

In this case, the information in the slides and photographs

was before the jury in other ways prior to their admission, and
additional alternatives existed and were urged by the defense.

The

State had two doctors testify, Dr. Palmer and the medical examiner
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Dr. Grey.

The testimony of both standing alone was able to

communicate any necessary information to the jury without the aid of
pictures.

See, in particular, the testimony of Dr. Grey at

T. 560-69 and of Dr. Palmer at T. 389-91, 395-400.
However, neither Dr. Grey nor Dr. Palmer was required to
communicate without visual aids.

Both doctors could have utilized

the anatomy chart with front and back overlays on which to mark
locations of bruises, etc., and on which they could have located
critical organ locations to support their explanations (T. 520-26).
Again, this method of communication was adequate to meet the
purposes of Dr. Grey's testimony; and important to the examination
of essentiality, the method was less prejudicing than the
photographs and slides.
Notably, the defense offered still other means which
would have been as effective as photographs and slides but much less
prejudicing.

Counsel noted:

Additionally, there are other options available to
the State through which they can provide the
information that the jury needs to decide the
case. They have the option of using models, they
have an option of bringing in a full size model
with organs in it if they wish to show that on
organs. They have the option of showing
diagrams. They have already used one diagram with
both anterior and posterior views that are plainly
visible to the jury. They have the option of
using models of the head. They certainly have the
option of black and white photos and they have the
option of getting their evidence in through
testimony, and as was done yesterday through
Dr. Marty Palmer's testimony, based upon having
looked at the autopsy report as he did himself
indicate (T. 551).
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Further options suggested were x-rays (T. 541), cropping photographs
(T. 545-46), and just using photographs without duplicative slides
blown up on a large screen (T. 545). The trial court erred in not
accepting and requiring any of these less prejudicial alternatives.
In short, the trial court's ruling failed to ever address
the threshold question of essentiality.
court erred in that failure.

As in State v. Cloud, the

Therefore, this Court, as did the

Supreme Court in Cloud, should find the admission of the photographs
in whole or part to be reversible error.

B. THE PHOTOGRAPHS AND SLIDES WERE MORE
PREJUDICIAL THAN PROBATIVE.
1.

THE ONLY PURPOSE OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS AND SLIDES WAS TO

INFLAME AND AROUSE THE SYMPATHIES OF THE JURY.

In this case, no

dispute existed over the injuries sustained by Miyako Sampson, nor
over the cause or causes of death.

The only issue in the case was

whether Mr. Sampson committed a second degree homicide or a
manslaughter (see Point V, infra).

With that in mind, the

photographs and slides that were admitted over objection were
without any legitimate purpose.

Their only value was to

impermissibly inflame the jury and arouse the jurors1 passions
against Mr. Sampson.

Cases from the Utah Supreme Court have not

permitted the admission into evidence of photographs without
evidentiary value except for a hoped-for emotional impact on the
jury.

See State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d at 752-53; State v. Wells, 603

P.2d at 813; and State v. Poe, 441 P.2d at 515.
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Several examples of the prosecution's attempt to present
visually inflammatory stimulus to the jury is found within the
record.

See Point VII, infra.

Perhaps the best example is the

State's attempt to introduce into evidence a video tape of the
retrieval of Miyako's lifeless body first from the trash-filled
dumpster and then from the garbage-filled plastic garbage sack and
the prosecutor's reaction to the court's ruling excluding the video
from evidence.

After viewing the video tape, the trial court ruled:

JUDGE YOUNG: I will say that I've got problems
with this and it only adds duplication to the
photographs that I've already admitted in the
motion in limine. And I don't think it serves any
additional probative value. It doesn't illustrate
any better the fact of death. The fact of death
is adequately established through the other
photographs and I will grant the motion in limine
in relation to the video tape (T. 368).
The prosecutor responded by first questioning the court's perception
of the quality of the tape and then by stating,
MS. KNIGHT-EAGAN: If I could make one inquiry?
By saying it's duplicative would the court
consider allowing us the choice which we'd rather
have in, the stills or the video? (T. 368-69).
By either viewing the video tape or reading the trial court's
response (T. 369), this Court can grasp the attempt by the
prosecutors to put inflammatory materials before the jury.

The

child's body was in a state of rigor mortis and the video tape,
although in black and white, is incredibly heartwrenching and
emotionally arousing.
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2.

THE PHOTOGRAPHS AND SLIDES WERE CUMULATIVE TO

THEMSELVES, EACH OTHER, AND OTHER TESTIMONY ADMITTED AT TRIAL,

Rule

403 allows relevant evidence to be excluded if it is cumulative.
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983).

Objections were lodged on

this basis (T. 367, 545). Photographic exhibits numbered 14-22 were
each repeated among the slides (T. 560-69).

Additionally, the

photographs and slides offered numerous views of the same bruises
and injuries (T. 543). The distinction between some photographs and
slides showing the same bruises was time only, an issue of literally
no relevance to the case (T. 543-45).
As indicated above, other methods of introducing the
information to the jury were also used including oral testimony and
the use of a full-bodied anatomy chart with front and back overlays
(T. 520-26).

The cumulative nature of the photographs and slides

should have resulted in the exclusion of many, if not all, the
photographs objected to by the defense.

Reversible error resulted

when the trial court failed to so rule.

3.

THE PHOTOGRAPHS AND THE SLIDES FUNCTIONED TO CONFUSE

THE ISSUES BEFORE THE JURY.

Rule 403 allows the exclusion of even

relevant evidence which is outweighed by its possibility of
confusing the issues before the jury.
Evidence (1983).

Rule 403, Utah Rules of

The issues in this case were confused by the

court, the State and most likely the jurors when the photographs and
slides were utilized to establish mental state (T. 849, 869-70).
discussed above, that contention was incorrect and has resulted in
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As

the reversal of convictions in the past.

See State v. Cloud, 722

P.2d at 754-55; and State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d at 1220-21.

That

same confusion of the issues in this case should also result in
reversal.

4.

THE PHOTOGRAPHS AND SLIDES PRESENTED MISLEADING

INFORMATION TO THE JURORS.

Rule 403 allows relevant evidence to be

excluded if the danger of misleading the jurors outweighs that
relevance.

Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983).

Several of the

photographs and slides presented to the jury were misleading and
required extra clarification which may have confused the jury.

In

particular, the autopsy photographs which showed the bruises on the
chin (especially No. 16) presented a view of the neck which appeared
as a strangulation-type injury because of refrigeration and the
congealing and solidification of fat cells.

Clarification was

attempted (T. 567); however, jurors may have speculated on their
own—especially after the prosecutor encouraged them to do so
(T. 871).
Additionally, many of the autopsy photographs revealed
circular marks on the body which were not injuries but marks left by
the autopsy table itself (T. 563-64, 568). Photographs and slides
of the buttocks demonstrated injuries acquired during the autopsy
procedures—slicing to determine bruise depth—and were not
representative of death-related injuries (T. 568-69).

Finally,

photographs and slides of the internal organs were alleged to
establish loss of blood by the liver tear (T. 565-66).
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Yet, laymen

are not readily aware whether intestines are normally coated with
blood.
Regarding each of these questions, oral testimony and
reliance on the anatomy chart overlays would have sufficed without
the misleading effects from the photographs.

Accordingly, the

photographs should have been excluded on the objection of the
defense; reversible error should follow the trial court's failure to
exclude the photographs.

5.

THE PHOTOGRAPHS AND SLIDES WERE UNDULY EMPHASIZED BY

THE STATE IN PROSECUTING THIS CASE.

Critical to the evaluation of

prior Utah Supreme Court cases is the emphasis the photographs
receive by the State.

This case contains the full variety of

emphatic use rebuffed in prior opinions.

In addition to the

aforementioned problems with the photographs and slides, they were
all in color rather than black and white.

The photographs were

enlargements, approximately 8" x 10" and mounted suitable for
framing.

Exacerbating the enlargement of the photographs is that

the slides were shown in a dimly lit courtroom and further enlarged
to 4 1 x 5' dimensions (T. 545) or more (T. 562, 887) such that the
jurors1 vision was more intently directed to the pictures.
Additionally, many of the photographs were closeups.
Also, several photographs were of full-body views whose purported
evidentiary value was a focused bruise (T. 545). When asked whether
the full-body picture could be cropped to only expose that injury to
minimize the inflammatory nature inherent in a child murder case,
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the State expressed its willingness to so crop the photographs
(T. 546). The trial court, however, ruled that cropping was
unnecessary (T. 546).
Finally, the prosecutors emphasized the photographs by
displaying them to the jurors during their closing arguments
(T. 849, 863, 869-71).

That type of emphasis has been hailed by the

Court as especially demanding of judicial scrutiny on appeal.
State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d at 754-55.

The State in this case

exaggerated rather than minimized the prejudicing nature of the
photographs.

The following cases support the assertion that the

photographs were overemphasized, indicating the factors listed above
as critical to that query.

State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1257;

State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d at 752-54; State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d at
63-64; State v. Wells, 603 P.2d at 812-13; State v. Poe, 441 P.2d at
514-15.
In conclusion, the photographs and slides utilized by the
State in this case were nonessential, gruesome and otherwise
violative of Rule 403 such that they should have been excluded by
the trial court.

The trial court erred when it failed to exclude

the photographs and slides.

Such an error cannot be overlooked by

espousing the doctrine of harmless error.

Rather, such an error

goes to the very heart of the constitutionally protected rights of
due process and fundamental fairness, to wit:

the right to a fair

and impartial jury.
An error which so impressionably taints the impartiality
of the fact finders cannot be harmless.
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As then Chief Justice Taft

stated in Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927):
[T]he requirement of due process of law in
judicial procedure is not satisfied by the
argument that men [and women] of the highest honor
and the greatest self-sacrifice could carry it on
without danger of injustice. Every procedure
which would offer a possible temptation to the
average man [or woman] . . . to forget the burden
of proof requirement to convict the defendant, or
which might lead him [or her] not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true between the State and
the accused, denies the latter due process of law.
Such a denial has occurred in this case; that error requires
reversal of Mr. Sampson's conviction.

POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT REFUSED TO ALLOW TESTIMONY FROM
DEFENSE WITNESS DR. MICHAEL DECARIA.
During the defense case, counsel for Carlos Sampson
indicated he would call Dr. DeCaria as a witness.

The State

objected to the testimony invoking Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3 (Supp.
1988) as disallowing the testimony for failure to give the requisite
notice of the statute.

That statute reads:

77-14-3. Insanity or diminished mental
capacity—Notice requirement—Expert testimony.
(1) When a defendant proposes to offer
evidence that he is not guilty as a result of
insanity or that he had diminished mental capacity
or any other testimony of a mental health expert
to establish mental state, he shall, at the time
of arraignment or as soon afterward as
practicable, but not fewer than 30 days before the
trial, file and serve the prosecuting attorney
with written notice of his intention to claim the
defense.
(2) When either the prosecution or the
defense intends to call any mental health expert
to testify at trial regarding a defendant's mental
state, excluding rebuttal testimony, the expert
shall be required to prepare a written report of
findings, and counsel intending to call the expert
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shall provide a copy of any report to opposing
counsel as soon as practicable, but not less than
ten days before trial.
(3) If the defendant fails to meet the
requirements of Subsection (1), he may not
introduce evidence tending to establish the
defense unless the court for good cause shown
otherwise orders.
(4) Nothing in this section is intended to
require the admission of evidence not otherwise
admissible.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3 (Supp. 1988).
The defense contended that Dr. DeCaria's testimony did
not center on Mr. Sampson's insanity, diminished mental capacity,
nor mental state and that the statute therefore was not applicable
(T. 704-05).

The defense further contended that Dr. DeCaria's

testimony was rebuttal testimony and permissibly within the
exception of the statute.

The trial court, over defense objection,

precluded Dr. DeCaria from testifying (T. 722).
Mr. Sampson indicates that, under the facts of this case,
Dr. DeCaria's testimony should have been admitted for good cause
shown—to rebut the State's heavy emphasis on demeanor
testimony—and that the court abused its discretion and erred when
it refused to allow the testimony.

Mr. Sampson further insists that

Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3 suffers from constitutional infirmities
requiring the statute to be stricken and his case remanded to the
trial court for new proceedings.

A. DR. DECARIA SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO
TESTIFY UNDER THE STATUTE.
The prosecution complained to the trial court that the
defense should have given them notice whether Dr. DeCaria would
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testify at trial.

The defense had told them he would not testify

inasmuch as he had not examined Mr, Sampson.

However, after the

State's case, it became apparent to the defense that the State's
repetitive testimony focusing on Mr. Sampson's calm demeanor needed
to be rebutted.

The State countered that the defense should have

known from the preliminary hearing of the importance of the demeanor
testimony and planned accordingly.
The State's argument to the trial court was fallacious.
On only four occasions during the preliminary hearing did the State
question witnesses about Mr. Sampson's demeanor—once each to the
Sheriff and the polygrapher, where the responses were situationally
"relaxed and passive" and "tired but alert," respectively (PHT. 71,
78), and twice to 7-Eleven clerk Wilken, who responded, "calm"
(PHT. 105, 107).
At trial, however, the State repeatedly questioned
witnesses as to the demeanor of Mr. Sampson—sometimes as often as
six times to a particular witness.2

The clear implication of the

answers was that his calmness equated to that of a calculated and
cold-blooded baby-killer.

Even the trial court observed the

emphasis on demeanor testimony and noted,
There have been too many questions asked and
answered repeatedly so far and I want--I think we
can hone in on the evidence a little better
without repeating them and going over them. I say

2 Pages where demeanor testimony was elicited by the
State are 146, 193, 244-48, 251, 252, 276, 279, 283, 294, 300, 317,
321, 344, 345, 378, 430, 455, 466, and 477.
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that to both sides. I'm not singling anybody
out. I'm saying we have covered the same ground
an awful lot. We have covered the same ground of
the demeanor of the defendant repeatedly,
repeatedly even with the same witness (T. 377-78).
The heavy prosecution emphasis on demeanor testimony could not have
been guessed, and Dr. DeCaria's testimony focusing on generic
stressers and adjustment disorders, as explanative of how some
people mask their emotions and appear to be calm as a coping
mechanism, should have been allowed to reach the jury as outside the
statute, within the exception of the statute, or under the "other
good cause" language of the statute.

The failure of the court to so

rule clashed Mr. Sampson's rights to call witnesses in his own
behalf with the notice requirement—a balancing that should have
been found in his favor.
Supporting the premise that Dr. DeCaria's testimony
should have been admissible is the manner in which the court ruled
regarding the testimony of Dr. Palmer, who testified for the
prosecution.

He testified regarding the accidental-nonaccidental

nature of the injuries sustained by Miyako which was objected to by
the defense on several grounds and allowed over those objections.
The defense likened the proffered testimony of Dr. DeCaria to that
of Dr. Palmer, who was allowed to testify for the State (T. 721).
Nonetheless, the court ruled that Dr. DeCaria's testimony created an
undue prejudice for the State because of the failure of notice under
Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3 (T. 722). This ruling was reached despite
the State's awareness from the inception that Dr. DeCaria was a
"player" in the case and a possible witness (T. 711). cf. State v.
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Case, 547 P.2d 221 (Utah 1976).

As the defense noted upon urging

reconsideration of the testimony of Dr. DeCaria,
Your Honor, with respect to the court's ruling
yesterday you allowed us to take exception as part
of your ruling. You indicated that you felt that
the State would be unduly prejudiced if, in fact,
we were allowed to call Dr. DeCaria. Just to
clear the record up, I would submit to the court
that the State has had access to investigators
throughout this trial daily, they have been coming
in and out of court every morning. Yesterday they
had Creighton Horton here, they had David Yocom
here, they had Bud Ellett here, Glen Iwasaki,
Karen Knight-Eagan and Leslie Lewis. They have a
budget in excess of eleven million dollars. I
can't see where the State would have been
prejudiced. I'm sure that, in fact, they could
have or they would have been able to obtain a
psychologist or psychiatrist to deal with what's
been termed an adjustment disorder that comprises
two and a half chapters in DSM-III. And I just
can't see where they were prejudiced. I think
they are not on trial; Mr. Sampson's on trial.
And I think the fact you did not allow Dr. DeCaria
to testify has seriously jeopardized his chances
of receiving a fair trial. (T. 506-07).
Notably, allowing Dr. Palmer's testimony over objections
and disallowing the testimony of Dr. DeCaria worked a substantial
denial of Mr. Sampson's rights to a fair trial under both the
federal and state constitutions.

Accordingly, this Court should

correct the erroneous ruling of the trial court and reverse the
conviction ordering that the case be remanded to the trial court for
a new trial.

B. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-3 PLACES AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION ON AN ACCUSED'S RIGHT
TO CALL WITNESSES IN HIS OWN BEHALF.
If this Court upholds the ruling of the trial court
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regarding the decision to preclude Dr. DeCaria's testimony,
Mr. Sampson requests that this Court reach and examine the issue of
the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3.

Specifically,

Mr. Sampson encourages this Court to find the statute
constitutionally infirm, both facially and factually, for placing
impermissible limitations on state and federal constitutional rights
to due process and the right to compulsory process and to call
witnesses in his own behalf.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3 suffers from several problems,
not the least of which is the ambiguity in the language "or any
other testimony of a mental health expert to establish mental state"
found in subsection (1). That language resurrects the question
permeating a majority of the claims of error outlined in this
appeal, to wit:

whether Mr. Sampson's demeanor at various stages is

relevant to his mental state at the time the child was killed.

More

particular to this issue is the question whether Dr. DeCaria, or any
mental health expert, can address the mental state of the accused
without having examined him.

The court's ruling on the

interpretation of the statute answered both these questions in a
manner which deprived Mr. Sampson of precious state and federal
constitutional rights.
Mr. Sampson has the constitutional rights to compulsory
process, which includes the fundamental right to present his
defense.

Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972); Washington v. Texas,

388 U.S. 14 (1967).

Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3 clashes headlong into

those rights by placing a procedural hurdle which, as in this case,
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can work hardships to the accused as he presents his defense.

As

the United States Supreme Court noted in a similar area:
In these circumstances, where constitutional
rights directly affecting the ascertainment of
guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be
applied mechanically to defeat the ends of justice.
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).
In Washington v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court
found a state statute which absurdly required that accomplices were
incompetent to testify for one another was violative of due
process.

388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967).

The Washington Court reminded that

the truth is more likely to be arrived at by
hearing the testimony of all persons of competent
understanding who may seem to have knowledge of
facts involved in a case, leaving the credit and
weight of such testimony to be determined by the
jury or by the court.
Id. at 22 (citing Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. at 471).
Admittedly, the United States Supreme Court has recently
ruled that an invocation of the right to compulsory process does not
automatically prohibit exclusion of a defense witness1 testimony as
a discovery violation sanction.
98 L.Ed.2d 798, 815 (1988).

Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S.

,

The Court in Taylor, however,

emphasized a balance must occur between the state's interest in
procedural concerns and the accused's rights to present a defense.
That Court noted:
The State's interest in protecting itself against
an eleventh hour defense is merely one component
of the broader public interest in a full and
truthful disclosure of critical facts.
Id. at 812 (quotations and citations omitted).

- 59 -

In Taylor, the Court

characterized the statutory violation as "fit[ting] into the
category of willful misconduct in which the severest sanction is
appropriate."

ixl. at 815.

Mr. Sampson's facts are readily distinguishable from a
willful violation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3.

The New Mexico

Supreme Court recently reviewed Taylor v. Illinois and offered sage
assessments.

In McCarty v. State, 763 P.2d 360 (N.M. 1988), the

court supported that Taylor should be narrowly constrained to its
facts because preclusion of such defense testimony, with its
constitutional base, is only appropriate in limited circumstances.
Id. at 362.

The McCarty court noted:

Preclusion, however, constitutes a conscious
mandatory distortion of the fact-finding process
whenever applied. Before a defendant's sixth
amendment rights are derogated as a sanction for
non-compliance, a trial judge must exercise his
discretion within recognized parameters, he must
consider other available ways to enforce a
criminal discovery rule.
Id. at 364.
The trial court in this case applied Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-14-3 in an unconstitutional manner which denied Mr. Sampson his
constitutional rights under the sixth and fourteenth amendments.
That error prejudiced his case by leaving critical State testimony
unrebutted.

Absent that error, the outcome of the case likely would

have been different; therefore, reversal of Mr. Sampson's conviction
is mandated.
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POINT V. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN MR, SAMPSONfS CONVICTION
OF SECOND DEGREE HOMICIDE,
Mr. Sampson insists that the evidence adduced at his
trial is incapable of sustaining the conviction he received of
Second Degree Homicide.

He requests this Court to reverse that

erroneous conviction and either impose a conviction for Manslaughter
or order that the charges against him be dismissed.
In State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), the
Utah Supreme Court stated, " [Notwithstanding the presumptions in
favor of the jury's decision, this court still has the right to
review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict."
Further, the Court noted:
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime for which he was convicted.
Id.

This Court has adopted this very same standard for reviewing

cases for the sufficiency of the evidence.

See, e.g., State v.

Garcia, 744 P.2d 1029, 1030 (Utah App. 1987).

This standard

restates the due process requirement which prohibits a criminal
conviction in any case except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt
of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the
defendant is charged.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979);

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466
(Utah App. 1988) .
The State charged Mr. Sampson with Second Degree Homicide
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under three alternative theories outlined in Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-203 (1953 as amended).

That section reads in pertinent part:

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the
second degree if the actor:
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the
death of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury
to another, he commits an act clearly
dangerous to human life that causes the death
of another;
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a
depraved indifference to human life, he
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk
of death to another and thereby causes the
death of another[.]
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1953 as amended).

The State's evidence,

both factually and as a matter of law, cannot support that
Mr. Sampson committed a Second Degree Homicide under any of the
theories proposed by the State.
The cause of death is not disputed in this case. Miyako
died of a severely lacerated liver with asphyxia also as a possible
component of death (T. 871, 902). The only real issue in the case
focuses on the mental state of Mr. Sampson at the time Miyako died
(T. 845, 883). The statements and testimony of Mr. Sampson do not
aid the State's claim that he intentionally killed his child or that
he intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury on his child. He
consistently denied any intent to kill or harm the child (T. 489,
637, 789, 792).
After clearing away the purely inflammatory arguments and
the State's appeals to the passions of the jury, what remains is
incapable of supporting a theory under either subsection (a) or
(b).

Attempts to characterize Mr. Sampson as cagey, intelligent,
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cogent, etc. (T. 877) cannot be seriously entertained.

The record

belies that claim; Mr. Sampson has experienced severe coping
dysfunction since his early childhood bout with Spinal Meningitis
(T. 75).
Similarly, the State's claim that Mr. Sampson possessed a
plan to strike back at Antoinette (T. 850-51) is without basis and
ignores essential facts of the case—most notably his desire to have
the visitation schedule which spawned most of the arguments and his
desire for the child to visit his mother while in California (T. 62,
778, 783-84).
The State also erroneously relies on the severity of the
liver tear to infer intent to kill or intent to cause such damage
(T. 870-71).

Even supposing that a man intended that blow, it is

doubtful he could muster the force required to inflict that damage
as testified to by the medical doctors.

Both doctors indicated the

force would necessarily be equivalent to a car wreck or a horse kick
(T. 410, 574-75, 873-74).

Notably, the medical examiner indicated

the same injury could be caused by compression from squeezing
(T. 614). That explanation supported the version as explained by
Mr. Sampson (T. 789) and is factually more feasible.
If at all sustainable, the jury's verdict must rely on
the depraved indifference theory of subsection (c). Again, however,
the State's support for this theory is factually and legally
bankrupt.

The State placed its reliance for this point on the

events which occurred after the death of Miyako, noting that those
actions are as important as the events before the death (T. 862,
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914).

The State misapprehends the law.

In State v. Bolsinger, 699

P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court dispelled that
belief.

The Bolsinger Court instructed that depravity must be found

in the killing not the subsequent behavior.

_Id. at 1220-21.

The

Court noted:
The jury may well have been swayed by the
reprehensible conduct of the defendant subsequent
to [the victim's] death. But that conduct is not
before us for review. The evidence is undisputed
that Kaysie was dead when defendant rose from the
bed. He himself covered her face with a sheet, a
universal gesture acknowledging death. At that
moment the conduct which subjected him to a charge
of criminal homicide came to an endTT
Id. at 1221 (emphasis added).
In this case, the State argues that the child was dead
before being carried from the house (T. 857). Events subsequent to
that time, despite their ugliness, do not support a Second Degree
Homicide conviction.

Moreover, in Bolsinger, the Court cited cases

demonstrative of depraved indifference (699 P.2d at 122); those
cases, see, e.g., State v. Nicholson, 585 P.2d 60 (Utah 1978), are
inapposite to the facts of this case.
Finally, the State asserted that the defendant's demeanor
of calmness equated to intent (T. 856). For the very same reasons
espoused in Bolsinger, such assertions are groundless.

The

testimony on demeanor evidence reflected post-death behavior and in
no way sheds light on the mental state possessed by Mr. Sampson at
the time of Miyako's death.
Mr. Sampson urges this Court to vacate the conviction of
Second Degree Homicide and either order the charges against him to
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be dismissed or to impose a conviction for Manslaughter.

POINT VI. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED
THE JURY ON THE DEFINITION OF DEPRAVED
INDIFFERENCE OVER THE OBJECTION OF MR. SAMPSON.
Mr. Sampson requested, in turn, two different
instructions on depraved indifference murder (R. 235, 246-47).

The

trial court refused both instructions choosing instead to adopt the
instruction prepared by the State (T. 921-22).

Mr. Sampson excepted

to the instruction given by the court claiming it did not adequately
guide the jurors nor take into account prior case law (T. 921-924).
The State responded that instructions Nos. 25 and 27 (R. 305 and
307, respectively) correctly stated the law (T. 926). Mr. Sampson
continues to urge he was prejudiced by the court's choice of
instructions.
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the question of
instructing jurors on the definition of depraved indifference in
several key cases.

State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988);

State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985); and State v. Fontana,
680 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984).

Mr. Sampson relied on Bolsinger and

Fontana to prepare, in turn, two different instructions gaged to
instruct the jury in accordance with the law.

Standiford appeared

after this case but indicates that Mr. Sampson was more attuned to
the critical concerns in this otherwise nebulous area.
Mr. Sampson claims that his first instruction (R. 235;
see Addendum B) more closely focused on the five areas espoused as
appropriate in Standiford:
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In sum, the jury should be instructed that to
convict of depraved murder it must find (1) that
the defendant acted knowingly (2) in creating a
grave risk of death, (3) that the defendant knew
the risk of death was grave, (4) which means
highly likely probability of death, and (5) that
the conduct evidenced an utter callousness and
indifference toward human life.
769 P.2d at 264.

The defense's second proffered instruction and the

State's choice (R. 247 and Addendum C; R. 307 and Addendum D;
respectively) fall shorter of meeting the requirements of Standiford,
Specifically, Mr. Sampson is concerned with point (5) of
Standiford and the failure of the given instruction to adequately
guide the jury regarding the intensity of the conduct.

The first

instruction (R. 235) included the key phrases missing from the given
instructions:
[T]here must be a knowing doing of an uncalled for
act in callous disregard of its likely harmful
effect which is so heinous as to be equivalent to
a "specific intent" to kill.
Examples followed that language.

See Addendum B.

Notably, the jurors had difficulty in deliberating about
depraved indifference, and they inquired of the court to clarify the
language of its instruction; the court refused to do so (R. 322).
Had the initially requested instruction been given, the jurors would
have had the guidance the court failed to give them.

Mr. Sampson

urges that the lack of guidance prejudiced his right to a fair
trial.

As noted in Standiford, "Certainly the difference in law

between a substantial risk of death and a grave risk of death should
be explained to a jury in meaningful and understandable terms."
P.2d at 263 (emphasis added).

Mr. Sampson asserts that the trial
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court's failure to clearly instruct the jury as he had requested,
and then later clarify the instruction, mandates reversal of his
conviction.
Mr. Sampsonfs position is buttressed by erroneous
language contained in instruction No. 25 which was relied on by the
State to fully inform the jury on the law of depraved indifference
(T. 926). That instruction (R. 305; see Addendum E) concluded with
language which instructed the jurors that they could not consider
Manslaughter as an alternative verdict until after resolving in
their minds the viability of the Second Degree Homicide charge.

In

State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 9 (Utah 1/31/89), the Utah
Supreme Court disapproved of this type of an instruction.

In

Gardner, no error was found because the instruction was oral rather
than written and because other instructions cured the confusion.
Id.

On these facts, however, written instruction No. 25 exacerbated

the already confusing and inadequate instructions on depraved murder
such that Mr. Sampson was denied substantial rights.

He,

accordingly, urges reversal of his conviction.

POINT VII: THE MISCONDUCT OF THE PROSECUTORS
PREJUDICED MR. SAMPSON AND DENIED HIM HIS
CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL.
Both the state and federal constitutions guarantee
Mr. Sampson, as they do any accused, the fundamental right to a fair
trial.

Fourteenth amendment, United States Constitution; Article I,

Sections 7 and 12, Utah Constitution.

In conformity with those

rights, prosecutors have as much of a duty to ensure the defendant
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receives a fair trial as they do to win cases.

The Utah Supreme

Court has noted:
We have previously stated that the State while
charged with vigorously enforcing the laws has a
duty to not only secure appropriate convictions,
but an even higher duty to see that justice is
done. In his role as the State's representative
in criminal matters the prosecutor, therefore,
must not only attempt to win cases, but must see
that justice is done. Thus, while he should
prosecute with earnestness and vigor, it is as
much his duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it
is to use every legitimate means to bring about a
just one.
Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 691 (Utah 1981) (quotations and
citations omitted).
A corresponding and long-standing precept of
Anglo-American jurisprudence insists that prosecutors not employ
arguments calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices of the
jury, nor direct the jury from its duty to decide the case on
anything other than the evidence before them.

Berger v. United

States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935); see also ABA Standards of Criminal
Justice 3-5.8(c and d ) , 3-6.1(3) (2nd ed. 1980); Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rule 3.4(e); and Code of Professional
Responsibility, DR7-106(c)(7).
In this case, the prosecutors violated the above tenets,
thereby sacrificing Mr. Sampson's rights to a fair trial as
constitutionally guaranteed him.

Specifically, prosecutors

prejudiced the rights of Mr. Sampson by engendering an atmosphere of
prejudice against him and by inflaming the jury's passions and
prejudices when they (1) introduced testimony regarding an odor of
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death and persisted with that testimony after objections had been
made and sustained; (2) introduced testimony of the morgue-scene
identification of Miyako by the mother, obtained a stipulation to
that issue, and again returned to question officers present at the
morgue for a description of the mother's reaction; (3) displayed
photographs to the jurors before they were admitted and after
warnings from the court to avoid publishing those particular
photographs to jurors pending a ruling on their admissibility; and
(4) misstated the law and critical facts in closing arguments.
The standard for reversing a conviction because of
prosecutorial misconduct propounded by the Supreme Court of Utah is
two-pronged.

The Court has stated:

The test of whether the remarks made by counsel
are so objectionable as to merit reversal in a
criminal case is [1] that the remarks called to
the attention of the jurors matters which they
would not be justified in considering in
determining their verdict, and [2] were [the
jurors], under the circumstances of the particular
case, probably influenced by those remarks.
State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984) (citing, inter alia,
State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973)).

Applying this

standard to Mr. Sampson's case demonstrates the prosecutor's
misconduct requires reversal of his conviction.

A.

ODOR OF DEATH TESTIMONY

During direct examination of the State's "critical"
witness, Curtis Owens, the following colloquy occurred:
Q
Did you have occasion to later come down to
the hall in connection with an odor that you had
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perceived?
A

Yes, I did.

Q
And can you tell the jury when that would
have been in relation to what you've just
described?
A
went
then
told
were

Well, it had to have been after
out to get, hum, to the ice box
I smelled this odor. And I went
him to take the diapers outside
smelling up the house.

that 'cause I
again. And
in there and
because they

Q
Can you describe what the odor that you
smelled was like?
A

Very harsh odor.

Q
Is there anything else notable about the odor
that you smelled?
A

It wasn't a diaper smell.

Q

What kind of smell was it?

A
It would be hard to describe other than it
was just that I've smelled it before.
Q

When have you smelled that odor before?

A

When my friend was shot.

Q

An odor of death?

MR. VALDEZ:
JUDGE YOUNG:

Objection, your Honor.
Sustained.

Q
(by Ms. Lewis) It was an odor that you
associated with death, Mr. Owens?
A

If you like to have it like that, yeah.

MR. VALDEZ:

Objection to that answer.

JUDGE YOUNG: Sustained. The answer will be
stricken. Unless there's an adequate foundation
as to what constitutes an odor of death the court
will instruct you not to refer to that in any
further questioning. I think that's inappropriate
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and can be misinterpreted by the jury.
And I will request that the jury please
ignore any references to that. That's certainly'
not an exact basis upon which a judgment can be
rendered.
MS. LEWIS:

Thank you, your Honor.

Q
(by Ms. Lewis) After smelling the odor that
you've described what occurred next?
A

I went in my room.

(T. 189-91).

After the completion of cross-examination, Mr. Sampson moved for a
mistrial (T. 217). That motion was denied by the court (T. 219).
However, in part, the court ruled that "an odor of death is
speculative and without foundation or basis."

The court further

ruled that he thought his discussion with the jury cured any
problem.

See Addendum F for discussion of the motion by the parties

and the court's ruling.
Nonetheless, despite the ruling of the court, the
prosecutor returned to this odor-of-death theme with the medical
examiner.
Q
[Ms. Lewis] Dr. Grey, what olfactory
indicators of death might one be aware o f —
MS. BOWMAN:
foundation.

I am going to object without further

JUDGE YOUNG: The objection on olfactory?
talking about smell?
MS. LEWIS:

You are

Yes, your Honor.

JUDGE YOUNG: What further foundation do you
need? I don't understand your objection on that.
MS. BOWMAN:
JUDGE YOUNG:

Can we approach the bench?
You may.

You better.
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(Whereupon, a discussion between court and counsel
was held at the bench, after which, the following
proceedings were had):
JUDGE YOUNG: After the discussion at the bench
the prosecutor has determined to withdraw the
question. (T. 582).
Notably, in closing argument, the prosecutor slightly toned down the
odor from odor of death to "a harsh, strong odor, his words, an odor
that he said he had only smelled one other time when in the presence
of a friend who was shot" (T. 853). This statement was followed
immediately by the description of the then viewed motionless child
(T. 853). The intended point of the prosecutor was missed by no one.
While conceding that the death of Miyako was never at
issue in this case, Mr. Sampson urges that this court should avoid
assessing these comments under the rubric of harmless error.
Rather, Mr. Sampson insists that the prosecutorfs dealings with the
odor-of-death testimony in the context of this case served no
purpose other than to inflame the passions and prejudices of the
jurors against Mr. Sampson such that his right to a fair trial by
impartial jurors was denied.

The testimony meets both prongs of the

Troy standard, requiring reversal.

B.

MORGUE-SCENE TESTIMONY

During the direct examination of Miyako's mother,
Antoinette Matthews, the following exchanges occurred:
Q
[Ms. Knight-Eagan]: Did there come a point
in time where they took you someplace from the
police station?
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A

[Antoinette Matthews]:

Yes.

Q
Do you remember—do you have any idea when
that was, Antoinette?
A

I think about 3:00.

Q

And where did they take you?

A
We went to TLC Day Care and they picked up a
friend of mine.
Q

Who was that?

A

Phyllis.

Q
And once Phyllis was picked up what did the
officers tell you?
A
They were driving and we went past the police
station and we kept driving down 4th South. And
he says, we found some clothes and a body and we
want you to look at the body.
Q

What was your response?

A
And I said, well, where did you find the
body, you know? How did you find it? And he
said, leads.
Q

What else did you tell him?

A
And I said, no, it's not my daughter.
not her.

It's

Q

Where did they take you?

A

To the medical examiners at the University.

Q

What happened there?

A
We walked in and I was sitting—a guy says,
sit down and he rolled this table out. And I
could see, I could see the head and I could see
all the squares.
Q

In her hair?

A

In her hair.
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MR. VALDEZ: Your Honor, we will stipulate to the
identification. I don't see any reason to drag
her through this grief.
JUDGE YOUNG:
MR. VALDEZ:

I think —
And possibly inflame the jury.

JUDGE YOUNG: Well, I'm not sure that it's going
to inflame the jury, it's a fact of what happened
in the events, but I think it probably is beyond
the scope of what needs to be done. They will
stipulate—
MS. KNIGHT-EAGAN:
JUDGE YOUNG:
MR. VALDEZ:

If they will stipulate —

That she identified the child.
Certainly.

MS. KNIGHT-EAGAN: Then that's fine, your Honor,
otherwise I think it's something we do need to
establish.
JUDGE YOUNG:

They have stipulated.

MS. KNIGHT-EAGAN: So the stipulation will be that
the child that Antoinette identified at the
medical examiners was Miyako Sampson?
MR. VALDEZ:

Yes.

MS. BOWMAN:

Yes.

JUDGE YOUNG:

All right.

Q
(by Ms. Knight-Eagan) Antoinette, would you
describe your relationship with your daughter?
A

We were—everywhere I went she went.

Q

Did you breast feed her?

A

I breast—

MR. VALDEZ: Your Honor, I am going to object as
to relevance.
JUDGE YOUNG:

Sustained.
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MS. KNIGHT-EAGAN: Your Honor, may we approach the
bench on that point?
JUDGE YOUNG:

You may.

(Whereupon, a discussion between the court and
counsel was held at the bench, after which, the
following proceedings were had):
JUDGE YOUNG: Following the conference at the
bench the court sustains the objection.
MS. KNIGHT-EAGAN: Your Honor, I have no further
questions at this time. (T. 75-77).
Later in the trial during the direct examination of Officer Syd
Elliott, the prosecutor returned to the morgue-scene theme
ultimately inquiring:
Q
[Ms. Lewis] What happened after you arrived
at the medical examiners office?
MR. VALDEZ: Your Honor, stipulate she I.D.'d the
child. I think we've been through this before.
MS. LEWIS: Well,
in a question and
think the jury is
observed in terms
response when she

your Honor, I'd like to ask this
answer format, if I may. I
entitled to know what this man
of the mother of the victim's
saw the body of this child.

JUDGE YOUNG: Well, are you talking about a
demeanor response?
MS. LEWIS:
JUDGE YOUNG:
overruled.

Yes, your Honor.
All right.

Well, the objection is

Q
(by Ms. Lewis) What happened when you
arrived at the medical examiner's office?
A
[Officer Elliott:] The child was brought
into the foyer or the lobby of the medical
examiner's office and the mother did identify the
child.
Q
Could you describe for the jury her demeanor
at the time upon seeing the child?
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A
She was extremely emotionally upset,
hysterically crying, sobbing and her knees buckled.
MS. LEWIS: Thank you.
(T. 347-48)

Nothing further.

Notably, the prosecutor returned yet one more time to
discuss the mother's demeanor upon viewing her dead child at the
morgue during closing argument when the prosecutor supplicated the
jurors:
As [Antoinette] left the child [with Carlos at his
apartment, Miyako] began to cry. The child
followed her out, grabbed at her leg crying. This
was the last time she saw the child. You will
remember—I should correct that. That's the last
time she saw the child alive.
She also testified she saw the child at the
medical examiner's office. And I would ask you to
remember her demeanor in that regard and how
difficult it was for her, how difficult it was for
her throughout to identify the property of the
little child and the personal effects that the
baby was wearing the day this occurred. (T. 851)
As with the odor-of-death testimony in subpoint A, the
morgue-scene testimony (and whether Miyako was breast-fed) is
irrelevant to the determinations at issue in this case.

The

prosecution had already established that Miyako was dead and that
she was Antoinette's daughter (T. 57). Even if relevant, the
defense had already stipulated to the morgue-scene identification of
Miyako by her mother.

The subsequent questions and answers served

no legitimate purpose other than to inflame the jury's passions and
prejudices against Mr. Sampson.

Such tactics are prosecutor

misconduct and on these facts require reversal of Mr. Sampson's
conviction.

State v. Troy, 688 P.2d at 486-87.
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C.

PREPUBLISHING PHOTOGRAPHS TO THE JURY

The defense filed a motion in limine to exclude
prejudicial photographs including State's exhibits 10 and 11.

While

the trial court had ruled on most of the photographs, he reserved
ruling on numbers 10 and 11 until he could determine if the proper
foundation could be laid for their admission.

When Dr. Palmer was

testifying, he showed a photograph (No. 20) to the jury which had
not been admitted.

The court cautioned Dr. Palmer not to show

photographs to the jury until they were admitted (T. 392).
Later when Lieutenant Forbes was testifying, the court
interrupted and indicated:
Let me state in relation to the next two exhibits
[State's 10 and 11], please don't publish those to
the jury at this point. You may lay a foundation
to those two exhibits with this witness but as to
their unique relevance which has been discussed in
chambers, until that foundation is laid I do not
want those exhibits published to the jury.
(T. 453).
The prosecutor then continued her examination of the lieutenant,
terminating her direct examination (T. 453-55).

Following a recess,

the prosecutor asked leave to ask two more questions of the
lieutenant; the court granted that request (T. 456). The following
events and discussion then occurred:
MS. LEWIS: I have just two more questions for
Lieutenant Forbes, your Honor.
JUDGE YOUNG: Prior to cross-examination you may
ask those questions.
MS. LEWIS:

Thank you.
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Q
(by Ms. Lewis) Lieutenant Forbes, with
reference to photographic exhibit No. 1 1 —
MS. BOWMAN:

Your Honor—

JUDGE YOUNG: Counsel, I would appreciate it if
you would pick those up carefully.
MS. LEWIS:
Honor.

I did pick them up carefully, your

JUDGE YOUNG: No, you didn't.
why the objection was coming.

And thatfs exactly

Q
(by Ms. Lewis) With reference to
photographic exhibits 10 and 11, Lieutenant
Forbes, do you recall, without looking at the
photographs, what they depict?
A

Yes, I do.

Q
And could you tell the jury what is depicted
on those two photographic exhibits?
A
Both of those photographs depict the child
after it was removed from the garbage sack.
(T. 456).
Later, out of the presence of the jury, the defense requested the
benefit of the record to better preserve what had occurred.
discussion is enclosed in its entirety at Addendum G.

That

Basically,

the defense suggested that despite the cautions from the judge, the
prosecutor picked up the critical photographs displaying the picture
side to members of the jury (T. 528-29).

The prosecutor disputed

that analysis claiming she did not display the picture side and made
an effort not to do so (T. 529). The court then clarified what
occurred indicating:
[W]hen you [Ms. Lewis,] picked up those pictures
here at the table that you picked up the picture,
bringing the front of the picture to your front
and it was held at your side, and at least in my
opinion, four of the jurors had a direct view of
that. And you then turned it back to the back.
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It was at that point that Ms. Bowman stood up and
began her objection. It was at that point I
interrupted her and told her that I anticipated
the objection she was making and I had observed
the conduct that you had in relation to the
picture. (T. 530-31).
The court then went on to indicate he believed that photographs 10
and 11 would be admitted and that the conduct did not prejudice
Mr. Sampson and, in any event, would be cured upon admission as
exhibits (T. 531).
Importantly, Mr. Sampson maintained a continuing
objection to the admission of various photographs including numbers
10 and 11.

He now asserts on appeal that the ultimate admission of

those photographs was reversible error.

See Point III, supra.

However, regardless of this Court's ruling on the propriety of the
photographs as exhibits, Mr. Sampson urges that this Court find the
prosecutor's behavior to be misconduct requiring reversal of his
conviction.
Applying the Troy standard to the occurrence claimed as
error herein is not without difficulty.

While the first prong is

inarguably met in light of the trial court's repeated cautionings to
not disclose photographs prior to admission, particularly numbers 10
and 11, the second prong—whether the jurors were influenced—
requires deeper analysis.

Mr. Sampson urges that the State's

behavior should be the focus as much as the photographs themselves.
Mr. Sampson claims that the State's methodology in prosecuting this
case in general, and specifically illustrated by these events, as
much or more than the photographs themselves, influenced the jurors
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to ultimately return an improper verdict of guilty on the Second
Degree Homicide charge.
[A prosecutor] may prosecute with earnestness and
vigor—indeed he should do so. But while he may
strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike
foul ones. It is . . . his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).

D. MISSTATEMENTS OF LAW AND FACT DURING CLOSING
ARGUMENT
During closing arguments, the prosecutor misstated
critical facts and misstated critical points of the law.

Such

errors meet the State v. Troy two-prong test and require reversal of
Mr. Sampson's conviction.
The prosecutor referenced testimony which had been
objected to and sustained.

She urged, as very telling and

indicative of Mr. Sampson's intent to kill Miyako, a statement that
Antoinette had testified to earlier in the trial.

Antoinette had

stated that following their last argument Mr. Sampson "was smiling
and laughing like the joke's on you" (T. 120). That statement was
objected to as conclusory and the objection was sustained (T. 121).
Yet, the prosecutor in closing stated:
And [Antoinette's] words were, he smiled as if the
joke's on you. And ladies and gentlemen of the
jury, that's a telling remark. And that becomes
extremely important because it is the State's
position that at that point in time the defendant
stated what his intent was . . . His demeanor was
suggestive that the man had a plan (T. 850-51).
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The prosecutor misstated key facts when she told jurors
that Carlos Sampson had told both of the 7-Eleven clerks that
"something" was stolen from his truck, as opposed to "his child"
(T. 855). Examining the testimony correctly establishes that the
testimony of Tina Wilcken and Stewart Simper indicates that
Mr. Sampson had stated "his little girl" was stolen (T. 245, 251).
The prosecutor misled the jury by critically misstating
the law regarding manslaughter.

She argued against a finding of

extreme emotional disturbance in part because Mr. Sampson "did not
believe he was defending himself" (T. 914). The defense objected
(T. 914), and the prosecutor's statement was sanctioned as correct
when the trial court overruled that objection (T. 914).
The prosecutor erroneously instructed jurors that, if the
defendant intended his conduct rather than the result, he should be
found guilty of Second Degree Homicide (T. 916). An objection
followed the comment, and the judge identified the pertinent
instructions (T. 916-17).
The prosecutor told jurors that their key witness, Curtis
Owens, received no deal from the State in exchange for his testimony
(T. 918) when he actually indicated that he received a promise from
the prosecutors to write a letter containing a favorable
recommendation to the courts in Nevada (T. 201). That letter was
significant because a new extortion conviction from Utah County in
1987 jeopardized Mr. Owens' probationary status in the Nevada system
for a prior Attempted Burglary charge (T. 206, 215-16).

In fact,

the State was withholding that letter until after his testimony in
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this case, further mischaracterizing the claim that no deals were
struck in exchange for his testimony (T. 123). The prosecutor's
closing argument on this point was misleading and wrong.
Finally, the prosecutor repeatedly interjected her own
opinion on the evidence and the guilt of Mr. Sampson.

See

Addendum H for a short list of the more egregious comments
personalized by the prosecutor.

Notably, the United States Supreme

Court has indicated that a prosecutor's personal opinion as to the
guilt of a defendant is irrelevant and improper to convey to the
jury.

United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985).

The Young Court

cited to the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on
Standards for Criminal Justice which had promulgated the following:
It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to
express his or her personal opinion as to the
truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or
the guilt of the defendant.
Id. at 6 (citing ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8(b) (2nd
ed. 1980)).
The prosecutor in Young indicated he thought the
defendant committed fraud and that he, the prosecutor, did not
believe the defendant acted with honor and integrity.

3[cL at 6.

The Court found these statements to be error and indicated the
concern over such misconduct by explaining that:
[t]he prosecutor's vouching for the credibility of
witnesses and expressing his personal opinion
concerning the guilt of the accused pose two
dangers: such comments can convey the impression
that evidence not presented to the jury, but known
to the prosecutor, supports the charges against
the defendant and can thus jeopardize the
defendant's right to be tried solely on the basis
of the evidence presented to the jury; and the
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prosecutorfs opinion carries with it the
imprimatur of the Government and may induce the
jury to trust the Government's judgment rather
than its own view of the evidence.
Id. at 18 (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. at 88-89).
In Young, the Court found the error to be non-reversible
primarily because the prosecutor had responded with the challenged
remarks in response, or by invitation, to the defense attorneyfs
closing argument which proceeded his rebuttal.

Such a redemption is

unavailable in this case as most of the prosecutor's
personalizations appeared in her closing argument proper, and not
her rebuttal.
For the reasons outlined above, Mr. Sampson urges that
the prosecutor's behavior meets the Troy standard because it was
improper and likely influenced the verdict.

Further, he insists

that the error cannot be held harmless because this case is a very
close case—see Points V and VI, supra—and even a minute error
could have been utilized to tip the balance in favor of a guilty
verdict on the Second Degree Homicide charge rather than the
Manslaughter charge.

His conviction, therefore, should be reversed.

POINT VIII. CUMULATIVE ERRORS OCCURRING IN THIS
CASE DENIED MR. SAMPSON HIS RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL.
If this Court fails to reverse his conviction on the
individual errors claimed herein, Mr. Sampson urges that the
cumulative effect of the errors certainly worked prejudice in
denying him a fair trial.

See Gooden v. State, 617 P.2d 248, 250

(Okla. Crim. App. 1980), wherein the court noted,
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[W]hen a review of the entire record reveals
numerous irregularities that tend to prejudice the
rights of a defendant and where an accumulation of
errors denies a defendant a fair trial, the case
will be reversed, even though one of the errors,
standing alone, would not be ample to justify
reversal.
The prejudice from the errors in this case cannot be quantified.

No

juror could have sufficiently distanced himself or herself from the
improper influences in this case.

The conviction of Mr. Sampson

must be reversed and a new trial ordered.

CONCLUSION
For all or any of the foregoing reasons, Appellant
Carlos R. Sampson respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
conviction and remand the case for a new trial or, alternatively,
impose a judgment against him for Manslaughter.
Respectfully submitted this

day of June, 1989.

^
l-v\,
ANDREW A. VALDEZ
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant y

[OHARD G. UDAi
Attorney for Defendai
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ADDENDUM A

77-35-18- Rule 18 — Selection of jury.

(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and
may be taken on one or more of the following grounds:

(13) Having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or
(14) That a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference
to the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted
to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public journals or
common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly upon
the matter to be submitted to him.

ADDENDUM B

INSTRUCTION NO.

Depraved indifference refers not to mental gtate but to the
objective circumstances under which the conduct causing the death
occurred.

Reckless conduct which has an incidental tragic result

will not suffice.
of the risk.

At the time of the act, the defendant must know

Knowledge here refers to the nature of the conduct or

the circumstances surrounding it or both but not the result produced
by the conduct.

The circumstances of the death when objectively

viewed must evidence a depraved indifference to human life and
thereby cause an unlawful death.

In other words, there must be a

knowing doing of an uncalled for act in callous disregard of its
likely harmful effect which is so heinous as to be equivalent to a
"specific intent" to kill.

Examples of this might be unmitigated

wickedness, extreme inhumanity or acts of a high degree of
wantonness.

ADDENDUM C

INSTRUCTION NO.

I have previously used the term "depraved indifference" in
these instructions.
statute.

The term is not specifically defined by

Thusf the phrase "depraved indifference" is a concept

which must be left largely to the experience and common sense of the
jury.

Depraved indifference refers not to a mental state but to the

objective circumstances under which the conduct causing the death
occurred.
To engage in conduct with a "depraved indifference to human
life," a person must do more than act "recklessly," even if the
reckless conduct has an incidental tragic result.

He need not have

as his conscious objective the desire to cause the result; not need
he be aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the
result.

However, the person must know that his conduct or the

circumstances surrounding it or both created a grave risk of death
to another.
The greatness of the risk which the defendant's actions
create and the lack of justification for the creation of the risk is
the test to be applied in determining whether the defendant's
conduct evidences a "depraved indifference to human life."
In determining whether the defendant acted with depraved
indifference, the circumstances under which the defendant acted are
to be viewed objectively from the standpoint of a reasonable person
and not subjectively by the actual state of the defendant's mind.

ADDENDUM D

INSTRUCTION NO.
I
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indifference" is a concept which must be left largely to the
experience and common sense of the jury.
To engage in conduct with a "depraved indifference to
human life,11 a person must do more than act "recklessly," but
he need not have as his conscious objective or desire to cause
the result; nor need he be aware that his conduct is reasonably
certain to cause the result.

However, the person must be aware

that his conduct created a grave risk of death to another.
The
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ADDENDUM E

INSTRUCTION NO.

?

Before you can convict the defendant, Carlos R. Sampson, of
the crime of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, a
First Degree Felony, as charged in the Information on file in
this case, you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable
doubt, all of the following elements of that offense:
1.

That on or about the 24th day of November, 1986, the

defendant, Carlos R. Sampson, caused the death of Miyako Sampson;
and
2.

That he did so intentionally or knowingly; or

3.

That,

intending

to

cause

serious

bodily

injury

to

Miyako Sampson, he committed an act clearly dangerous to human
life that caused the death of Miyako Sampson; or
4.

That, acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved

indifference to human life, he knowingly engaged in conduct which
created a grave risk of death to another and thereby caused the
death of Miyako Sampson.
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of
the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt,
it is your duty to convict the defendant, Carlos R. Sampson, of
Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree.

If the evidence

has failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt one or more of
the

said

elements,

then

you cannot

find

him

guilty

of that

offense and you may then consider whether the defendant is guilty
of Criminal Homicide, Manslaughter, a lesser included offense.
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ADDENDUM F

1

2

JUDGE YOUNG:
THANK YOU FOR YOUR

FESFIMONY.

3

MS. LEWIS:

4

EXCUSED AT THIS FIME?

5

JUDGE YOUNG:

6

MR. VALDEZ:

7

YOUR HONOR, MAY FHIS WIFNESS BE

ANY OBJECFION?
NO OBJECFION, BUF WE'D LIKE HIM

BACK TOMORROW IN FHE EVENF

8

MS. LEWIS:

9

JUDGE YOUNG:

10

YOU MAY STEP DOWN, MR. OWENS,

FHAF WE'D LIKE FO CALL HIM BACK.

YOUR HONOR —
IN FHAF EVENF FHEN HE'S NOF EXCUSED

HE T S EXCUSED TODAY BUF HE'S SUBJECF FO SUBPOENA.

11

WOULD YOU BE AVAILABLE AGAIN TOMORROW, MR. OWENS?

12

THE WITNESS:

13

MR, VALDEZ:

14

PERMANENTLY EXCUSED AT FHIS FIME.

15

JUDGE YOUNG:

16

I GOF A JOB FO GO FO.
YOUR HONOR, WE DON' F WANF HIM

HE'S NOF EXCUSED SUBJECT TO

SUBPOENA.

17

COURF WILL BE IN RECESS.

18

(RECESS) .

19
20

JUDGE YOUNG:

DURING

FHE RECESS COUNSEL HAS

21

REQUESTED THAT FHERE'S A MAFFER THEY'D LIKE TO FAKE UP WITH

22

FHE COURF OUTSIDE FHE PRESENCE OF THE JURY.

23
24
25

THE RECORD MAY SHOW FHAF WE ARE CONVENED NOW
I N COURT WITHOUT THE JURY PRESENT.
MS. BOWMAN:

YES, YOUR HONOR.

AND FHAF MOTION
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1

IS WE ARE MOVING FOR A MISTRIAL BASED UPON THE PROSECUTOR'S

2

QUESTION PUT TO CURTIS OWENS WHICH WAS OBJECTED TO

3

IMMEDIATELY REGARDING WAS THE ODOR CHARACTERIZED AS SOME-

4

THING LIKE AN ODOR OF DEATH.

5

IMMEDIATELY.

6

REMARK WILL BE STRICKEN BUT, NONETHELESS, THE JURY HEARD

1

IT.

8

ANY ADMONISHMENT IS NOT GOING

9

IT ? S SO PREJUDICIAL AND WITHOUT ADEQUATE FOUNDATION ON THE

10

YOU ADMONISHED

THERE WAS AN OBJECTION MADE
THE JURY, I BELIEVE, THAT THE

WE KNOW THEY CAN'T CANCEL

THAT OUT OF THEIR MIND AND
TO ERASE ANY EFFECT.

AND

FACTS THAT WE ARE MOVING FOR A MISTRIAL AT THIS POINT.

11

MS. LEWIS:

IF I MIGHT JUST ADDRESS THAT, YOUR

12

HONOR?

13

TION ABOUT THE ODOR OF DEATH HAD BEEN IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED

14

BY A STATEMENT FROM THE WITNESS WHEN HE WAS ASKED TO

15

DESCRIBE WHAT ODOR.

16

AN ODOR HE HAD SMELLED WHEN A FRIEND OF HIS HAD BEEN SHOT.

17

THERE WAS NO OBJECTION

18

AND THE LEADING QUESTION, WAS THIS AN ODOR OF DEATH, WAS

19

A FOLLOW-UP ON THIS.

20

OBJECTIONABLE ABOUT THAT PARTICULAR QUESTION WAS THE LEADING

21

NATURE.

22

ROOM WHO WOULD NOT ACKNOWLEDGE

23

WITNESS, AT BEST, AND I THINK THAT IT IS CLEAR

24

THE HOSTILE WITNESS A LEADING QUESTION

25

AS THE COURT WILL RECALL, THAT STATEMENT OR QUES-

HE INDICATED THAT IT WAS AN ODOR LIKE

TO THAT QUESTION OR THAT ANSWER.

THE ONLY THING THAT MAY HAVE BEEN

AND I DON'T THINK THERE'S ANYONE IN THIS COURTTHAT THIS WAS A HOSTILE
THAT WITH

IS PERMISSIBLE.

AND IF THERE WAS A PROBLEM WITH THE QUESTION
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1

I BELIEVE THE COURT CURED THAT PROBLEM BY ITS PROMPT, CLEAR

2

ADMONISHMENT TO THE JURY AND REQUEST THAT THE ANSWER BE

3

STRICKEN AND THE JURY DISREGARD IT.

4

THAT WOULD BE OUR RESPONSE.

5

JUDGE YOUNG:

6

MS. BOWMAN:

THANK YOU.
IN RESPONSE TO THAT WE INDICATE

7

THEY CALLED HIM AS THEIR WITNESS, THEY KNEW WHAT HIS PERSON-

8

ALITY IS LIKE, AND HE IS NOT A HOSTILE WITNESS.

9

TESTIFYING.

HE'S NOT HOSTILE TO THEM.

HE'S

HE WAS TESTIFYING

10

FOR THEM.

11

THINK THAT IF THE PROSECUTOR HAD STOPPED WITH THE RESPONSE,

12

WITH MR. OWENS 1 RESPONSE, THAT IT WAS SIMILAR

13

THAT HE SMELLED WHEN A FRIEND WAS SHOT, FINE, BUT THE

14

PROSECUTOR ASKED ONE MORE QUESTION.

15

VERY PURPOSEFUL.

16

HE IS A LITTLE UNRULY BUT NOT HOSTILE.

JUDGE YOUNG

ALL RIGHT.

TO THE MISTRIAL.

AND I

TO AN ODOR

THAT QUESTION WAS VERY,

THE COURT'S HEARD YOUR

17

ARGUMENT IN RELATION

THE QUESTION AS TO

18

WHAT AN ODOR OF DEATH REALLY

19

ANYONE'S CONCLUSION AS TO WHAT IT MIGHT BE—THERE'S NO

20

FOUNDATION OR BASIS FOR IT.

21

OF THE OBJECTIONABLE PHRASE IN DISCUSSION WITH THE JURY.

22

YOUR MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL IS DENIED.

IS IS SO SPECULATIVE AS TO

I THINK THE COURT TOOK CARE

23

MS. BOWMAN:

THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

24

MR. VALDEZ:

THANK YOU.

25

(WHEREUPON, THE JURY WAS BROUGHT BACK INTO THE
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ADDENDUM G

I NOON RECESS IF YOU TAKE THAT OPPORTUNITY AND REVIEW THE
2 SLIDES IN THE EVENT THAT THERE ARE ADDITIONAL SLIDES TO THOSE
3 THAT HAVE BEEN REPRODUCED INTO A PHOTOGRAPH.
4

WE WILL EXCUSE THE JURY FOR LUNCH.

5 AT 2:00 O'CLOCK.
6

WE WILL RETURN

PLEASE REMEMBER MY PREVIOUS ADMONITIONS.

(WHEREUPON, THE JURY LEAVES THE COURTROOM).

7
8

MS. BOWMAN:

YOUR HONOR, WE ALSO HAVE A MATTER.

9 JUST TO PRESERVE THE RECORD WE'D LIKE TO HAVE THE RECORD
10 REFLECT EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENED WITH THE PROSECUTOR'S CONDUCT
!!

YESTERDAY REGARDING THE PHOTOGRAPH AND THE DANGER THAT THE

12 JURY POSSIBLY SAW THAT AND YOUR ADMONISHMENT TO THE STATE
13 REGARDING THAT.

WE WANT THAT TO BE CLEAR IN THE RECORD

14 EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENED.
15
16

JUDGE YOUNG:
IN RELATION TO IT?

17
18

DO YOU DESIRE TO STATE ANY MORE

MS. BOWMAN:

I THINK THE RECORD SHOULD REFLECT

SHE PICKED UP THE PHOTOGRAPH WITH HER BACK TO THE JURY AND

19
WITH THE PHOTOGRAPH FACING HER ANTERIOR SIDE OF HER BODY,
20
AND THAT THE JURY POSSIBLY SAW IT AT THAT POINT, AND THEN
21
IT WAS SHOWN TO THE WITNESS AND THEN THERE WAS THE ADMONISH22
MENT.
23
MS. LEWIS:

I WOULD LIKE TO INDICATE I WAS VERY

24
CLEARLY ADMONISHED IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY AND I THINK
25
THE RECORD WAS VERY WELL MADE ON THAT PARTICULAR POINT AND
528

1

'THAT, I BELIEVE, COUNSEL IS CORRECT IN STATING THAT I WAS

2

| BETWEEN THE JURY AND YOUR HONOR AND THAT I HAD MY BACK TO

3 THEM AND HAD THE PHOTOGRAPH TOWARD ME WITH THE WHITE PORTION
4 OF THE PHOTOGRAPH, THAT IS THE FIBERBOARD, FACING THEM, AND
5

THE PICTURE TURNED AWAY.

6

MR. VALDEZ:

THAT'S NOT CORRECT.

7

MS. BOWMAN:

MAY THE RECORD REFLECT, THE JURY

8

BOX IS CURVED AND YOU PROBABLY CANNOT TURN YOUR BACK TO

9

EVERYBODY IN THE JURY.

10
11

MS. LEWIS:

I MADE WHAT I PERCEIVED TO BE AN

I EFFORT, YOUR HONOR, TO SHOW THE PHOTOGRAPH TO NO ONE. I

*2 I DID PICK UP THE PHOTOGRAPH IN ORDER TO LOOK AT THE EXHIBIT
13

NUMBER AND ALSO WHAT WAS DEPICTED ON THE OTHER SIDE WITH

14

j MY BACK TO THEM AS FAR AWAY FROM THEM, IN FACT, STANDING

15

| UP TO THE CLERK'S DESK.

16

AND I WOULD FURTHER INDICATE, YOUR HONOR, THAT

17 MY UNDERSTANDING AS TO THE COURT'S RULING WAS VERY CLEARLY
18

THAT WE WERE NOT TO PUBLISH THEM TO THE JURY AT THAT TIME,

19

BUT THAT EARLIER IN CHAMBERS, THE COURT HAD INDICATED THAT

20

THOSE PARTICULAR TWO PHOTOGRAPHS WOULD, AT SOME POINT, BE

21
22
23
24
25

ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.
AND MY UNDERSTANDING FURTHER IS THAT ARGUMENT
WAS MADE BY BOTH DEFENSE AND PROSECUTION ON THAT PARTICULAR
POINT BEFORE THAT RULING WAS MADE AND THAT THE COURT VERY
APPROPRIATELY INDICATED THAT THERE NEEDS TO BE FURTHER
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1

TIE-UP ON THE MEDICAL BUT THAT ULTIMATELY THOSE EXHIBITS

2

WOULD BE COMING IN.

3

JUDGE YOUNG:

ANYTHING FURTHER FOR THE RECORD?

4

MR. VALDEZ:

NO.

5

MS. BOWMAN:

NO.

6

JUDGE YOUNG:

THE COURT WILL INDICATE TO YOU,

7

MS. LEWIS, THAT THE COURT, WHEN THOSE TWO EXHIBITS WERE

8

PROFFERED EARLIER

9

I DESIRED THAT THOSE EXHIBITS BE PROTECTED FROM THE VIEW

IN THE TESTIMONY, INDICATED TO YOU THAT

10

OF THE JURY AND THAT THEY BE PROTECTED UNTIL A PROPER

11

FOUNDATION HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR THEIR

12

RELATION TO THE INDIVIDUAL BRUISINGS OF THE CHIN.

13

ONE WAS A LEFT VIEW AND THE OTHER WAS A RIGHT VIEW AND I

14

DID NOT WANT THEM ADMITTED UNTIL THEY HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED

15

BY THE DOCTOR TO BE AN IMPORTANT REPRESENTATION FOR HIM TO

16

EXAMINE IN RELATION TO THE ULTIMATE EXAMINATION OF THE CHILD,

17

IMPORTANCE IN
AND THAT

I WILL ALSO INDICATE TO YOU THAT WHEN YOU PICKED

18

UP THOSE PICTURES HERE AT THE TABLE THAT YOU PICKED UP THE

19

PICTURE, BRINGING THE FRONT OF THE PICTURE TO YOUR FRONT

20

AND IT WAS HELD AT YOUR SIDE, AND AT LEAST IN MY OPINION,

21

FOUR OF THE JURORS HAD A DIRECT VIEW OF THAT.

22

TURNED IT BACK TO THE BACK.

23

BOWMAN STOOD UP AND BEGAN HER OBJECTION.

24

POINT I INTERRUPTED HER AND TOLD HER THAT I ANTICIPATED THE

25

OBJECTION SHE WAS MAKING AND I HAD OBSERVED THE CONDUCT THAT

AND YOU THEN

IT WAS AT THAT POINT THAT MS.
IT WAS AT THAT
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1 YOU HAD IN RELATION TO THE PICTURE.
2

AND I WANT TO INDICATE AGAIN FOR THE RECORD THAT

3

ULTIMATELY

4

PICTURES WILL BE ADMITTED, BUT THAT I HAD INSTRUCTED YOU

5

NOT TO SHOW THOSE TO THE JURY UNTIL THEY HAVE HAD AN OPPOR-

6

TUNITY TO BE APPROPRIATELY ESTABLISHED BY FOUNDATION THAT

7

THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADMITTED.

8

PICTURES WERE CARELESSLY HANDLED IN THIS COURT AND WERE

9

REFLECTED TO THE JURY AND I SO INDICATED AT THAT TIME.

10

IT IS MY IMPRESSION AT THIS POINT THAT THOSE

IT IS MY VIEW THAT THOSE

NOW, IT IS ALSO MY VIEW THAT HAVING SO INDICATED,

11

THAT I BELIEVE THAT THAT CONDUCT DID NOT PREJUDICE THE JURY

12

AND THAT THAT CONDUCT, IF THE PICTURES ARE SUBSEQUENTLY

13

RECEIVED AFTER AN APPROPRIATE FOUNDATION, WOULD CLEARLY BE

14

CURED BY THE RECEIPT OF THE PICTURES.

15

THAT THERE WILL BE ULTIMATELY A CONTINUING OBJECTION TO THOSE

16

PICTURES, BUT I WAS DISAPPOINTED

17

j HANDLED, TO SAY THE LEAST

18

I

19
20

SO I DO NOT BELIEVE

IN THE WAY THEY WERE

LET'S PROCEED WITH THE OTHER PICTURES THAT WE
NEED TO SEE.

I

MS. KNIGHT-EAGAN:

YOUR HONOR, IN CHAMBERS YESTER

21

DAY I HAD EXPLAINED TO THE COURT THAT WE HAD NOT MADE PHOTO-

22

I GRAPHIC DUPLICATES OF EACH OF THE SLIDES BUT ONLY THOSE THAT

23

WE FELT SHOULD GO WITH THE JURY, IN ADDITION TO BEING USED

24

BY DR. GREY TO EXPLAIN HIS TESTIMONY.

25

SUBSTANTIVELY ALONG WITH THE SLIDES.

THOSE WE WANT TO ADMIT
AS LONG AS WE'RE CLEAR
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ADDENDUM H

FROM PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING ARGUMENT

"We next talk about witnesses who chronologically came next, and
those are the 7-Eleven witnesses. And in this regard I would
indicate to you that these people had no bias, no motive to come
into this courtroom and tell you something that wasn't the truth"
(T. 854).
"[Miyako's shirt] was found in the parking lot at the residence
where defendant lived and where the fight had occurred earlier and
the child's death had occurred. This is important because I think,
again, it's an indication of the defendant's intent" (T. 859).
W

I would suggest to you that the police witnesses did an excellent
job in this case, in their testimony, and their conscientious police
work in connection with the case" (T. 868).
"About a year before the child died [Carlos and his brother] had a
fight over levi's and the defendant exhibited some real anger,
kicked in a door, slapped his brother in the back of the neck.
Well, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I think that's a telling
thing too" (T. 875).
"And when [Antoinette] left, I would submit to you, ladies and
gentlemen of the jury, [Carlos! finally decided on a way to get
even" (T. 877-78).

NOTE: Other such statements occur at T. 848, 852, 854, 858, 861,
865, 868, 872, 877, 878, 879, 881.

